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McKEE, Chief Judge.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
“Since the late 19th century, the United States has
restricted immigration into this country. . . . But despite the
existence of these legal restrictions, a substantial number of
persons have succeeded in unlawfully entering the United
9States, and now live within [the] various States.”  Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982).  The dispute we are now called upon
to address is one of an increasing number of cases that have
arisen from actions that state and local governments have taken
because of illegal immigration. 
The City of Hazleton, Pennsylvania (“Hazleton” or the
“City”) is appealing a permanent injunction that the district
court entered prohibiting Hazleton’s enforcement of two local
ordinances that attempt to regulate employment of, and
provision of rental housing to, certain aliens.  Several
individuals and organizations sued to enjoin enforcement of the
ordinances arguing that they violate the United States
Constitution, as well as federal and state statutes.  The district
court agreed and enjoined Hazleton from enforcing the
ordinances in their entirety. 
We now hold that the district court erred in reaching the
10
merits of the challenge to the private cause of action provision
because no plaintiff has standing to challenge that provision.
Accordingly, that portion of the district court’s order will be
vacated.  However, although our reasoning differs somewhat
from the analysis used by the district court, we conclude that it
correctly enjoined the rest of the challenged ordinances.  We
will therefore affirm the district court’s order in all other
respects.
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.  Hazleton  and its Ordinances
The City of Hazleton is located in Luzerne County in
northeastern Pennsylvania.  Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F.
Supp. 2d 477, 484 (M.D. Pa. 2007).  Under Pennsylvania law,
Hazleton is classified as a City of the Third Class and operates
under an “Optional Plan B” form of government.  Id.  Its
executive is a mayor, and its legislature is a city council.  Id.
 Hazleton refers to persons who are not lawfully present1
within the United States as “illegal aliens.”  Plaintiffs refer to them
as “undocumented immigrants.”  We recognize that there are
significant criticisms of each term.  See, e.g., Beth Lyon, When
More “Security” Equals Less Workplace Safety: Reconsidering
U.S. Laws that Disadvantage Unauthorized Workers, 6 U. Pa. J.
Lab. & Empl. L. 571, 576 (2004) (“Scholarly and popular concerns
about the phrase ‘illegal alien’ abound, pointing out that the phrase
is racially loaded, ambiguous, imprecise, and pejorative.”);
Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 518, 522
n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“[T]he term ‘illegal alien’ [is] less
ambiguous [than the term ‘undocumented immigrant.’]”), rev.
granted, 198 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2008).
(continued...)
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Hazleton's population was only 23,000 in 2000.  Id.
Between 2000 and the time of trial, however, its population
increased to between 30,000 and 33,000.  Id.  Much of this
growth was due to an influx of Latino families who migrated
from New York and New Jersey to Pennsylvania in the early
2000s.  Id.  These newcomers included United States citizens
and lawful permanent residents, as well as persons lacking
lawful immigration status, who are often referred to as
“undocumented immigrants” or “illegal aliens.”   Id.  1
(...continued)1
Federal immigration law defines an “alien” as “any person
not a citizen or national of the United States.”  8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(3).  “Immigrant” is defined as “every alien except an alien
who is within [certain specified] classes of nonimmigrant aliens,”
and generally refers only to lawful permanent residents.  8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(15).  Congress has preferred the term “alien” to describe
those persons who lack lawful immigration status, see, e.g., 8
U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1227, 1228.  We will use the word “alien” rather
than “immigrant” because “alien” is more precise, and precision is
important to discussions in this area.  When discussing issues of
employment, we will use the official term: “unauthorized alien.”  8
U.S.C. § 1324a.  However, when discussing issues of immigration
status, we will use either: “aliens not lawfully present” or “aliens
lacking lawful immigration status,” rather than “illegal aliens.”
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Hazleton’s mayor, as well as other local officials,
subsequently concluded that aliens lacking lawful status were to
blame for certain social problems in the City, see J.A. 1672-85,
and that the federal government could not be relied upon to
prevent such aliens from moving into the City, or to remove
them, see Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 522 n.44.  Accordingly,
City officials decided to take independent action to regulate the
local effects of unlawful immigration.  See J.A. 1385, 1486-87.
 On July 13, 2006, Hazleton enacted Ordinance 2006-10,2
the first version of the IIRAO.  On August 15, 2006, the City
enacted Ordinance 2006-13, the RO.  On September 21, 2006,
Hazleton enacted Ordinance 2006-18, a revised version of the
IIRAO, which replaced Ordinance 2006-10 in its entirety.  On
December 28, 2006, Hazleton enacted Ordinance 2006-40, which
amended the IIRAO by adding an “implementation and process”
section.  Finally, during trial, the City enacted Ordinance 2007-6,
which again amended the IIRAO to provide that complaints based,
in full or in part, on national origin, ethnicity, or race, would be
considered invalid.  The full-text of these ordinances is attached as
an Appendix.
13
Beginning on July 13, 2006, Hazleton’s City Council began
enacting a series of ordinances designed to address these
concerns.  Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 484. 
This litigation concerns two of those ordinances: the
Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance (“IIRAO”), which
consists of Ordinance 2006-18, as amended by Ordinance 2006-
40 and Ordinance 2007-6; and the Rental Registration
Ordinance (“RO”), which consists of Ordinance 2006-13.2
These ordinances attempt to regulate the employment of
unauthorized aliens, and the provision of rental housing to aliens
  It is important to note that the parties hotly contest3
whether aliens in Hazleton actually caused any of these purported
problems and whether Hazleton officials had any valid reason to
think they did.  The district court did not make any factual findings
about the cause of any social or fiscal problems Hazleton may be
facing, and our discussion should not be interpreted as supporting
either side of that debate.
14
lacking lawful immigration status, within Hazleton.
1.  The Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance
The IIRAO begins with a statement of findings and a
declaration of purpose, which asserts:
[t]hat unlawful employment, the harboring of illegal aliens in dwelling units
in the City of Hazleton, and crime committed by illegal aliens harm the health,
safety and welfare of authorized US workers and legal residents in the City of
Hazleton.  Illegal immigration leads to higher crime rates, subjects our
hospitals to fiscal hardship and legal residents to substandard quality of care,
contributed to other burdens on public services, increasing their cost and
diminishing their availability to legal residents, and diminishes our overall
quality of life.
IIRAO § 2C.   In response to these concerns, the IIRAO:3
seeks to secure to those lawfully present in the United States and this City,
whether or not they are citizens of the United States, the right to live in peace
free from the threat [of] crime, to enjoy the public services provided by this
city without being burdened by the cost of providing goods, support and
services to aliens unlawfully present in the United States, and to be free of the
debilitating effects on their economic and social well being imposed by the
influx of illegal aliens to the fullest extent that these goals can be achieved
consistent with the Constitution and Laws of the United States and the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
 The IIRAO defines “business entity” broadly to mean4
“any person or group of persons performing or engaging in any
activity, enterprise, profession, or occupation for gain, benefit,
advantage, or livelihood, whether for profit or not for profit.” 
IIRAO § 3A.  The term encompasses (but is not limited to) “self-
employed individuals, partnerships, corporations, contractors, and
subcontractors.”  IIRAO § 3A(1).  It includes “any business entity
that possesses a business permit, any business entity that is exempt
by law from obtaining such a business permit, and any business
entity that is operating unlawfully without such a business permit.” 
IIRAO § 3A(2).
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IIRAO § 2F.
Section 4 of the IIRAO asserts that it is unlawful “for any
business entity” to “recruit, hire for employment, or continue to
employ” or “permit, dispatch, or instruct any person” who is an
“unlawful worker” to perform work within Hazleton.   IIRAO4
§ 4A.  Under the IIRAO, an “unlawful worker” is defined as: “a
person who does not have the legal right or authorization to
work due to an impediment in any provision of federal, state or
local law, including but not limited to a minor disqualified by
nonage, or an unauthorized alien as defined by [8 U.S.C. §
1324a(h)(3)].”  IIRAO § 3E.  Section 4A requires “[e]very
business entity that applies for a business permit” to “sign an
 8 U.S.C. §1373(c) states: “The Immigration and5
(continued...)
16
affidavit . . . affirming that they do not knowingly utilize the
services or hire any person who is an unlawful worker.”  IIRAO
§ 4A.  
Section 4 also provides for public monitoring,
prosecution, and sanctions.  Any City resident may submit a
complaint to Hazleton’s Code Enforcement Office alleging that
a local business entity is violating the section’s prohibition on
utilizing the services of an unlawful worker.  IIRAO § 4B(1).
Upon receipt of such complaint, the Code Enforcement Office
requests identity information about the alleged unlawful worker
from the employing business, and that business must provide the
information within three business days, or Hazleton will suspend
its business license.  IIRAO § 4B(3).  If the worker is alleged to
be an unauthorized alien, the Code Enforcement Office submits
any identity information received from the business to the
federal government, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373, for
verification of “the immigration status of such person(s).”   Id.5
(...continued)5
Naturalization Service shall respond to an inquiry by a Federal,
State, or local government agency, seeking to verify or ascertain
the citizenship or immigration status of any individual within the
jurisdiction of the agency for any purpose authorized by law, by
providing the requested verification or status information.”
 This three business day period is tolled if the business6
entity acquires further information about the worker and requests a
secondary verification from the federal government of the worker’s
authorization, or if the business entity tries to terminate the worker
and that worker challenges the termination in Pennsylvania state
court.  IIRAO § 7C.
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If the Code Enforcement Office confirms that the worker
lacks authorization to work in the United States, the business
must terminate that person within three business days or the City
will suspend its business license.   IIRAO § 4B(4).  Safe harbor6
from this sanction is provided to businesses that verify the work
authorization of its workers through use of the “Basic Pilot
Program” (which has since been named “E-Verify”).  IIRAO §
4B(5).  E-Verify is a federal program for verifying work
authorization which Congress has authorized for use on a trial
basis.  
A business whose license is suspended under the IIRAO
 City agencies and business that contract with the City for7
amounts greater than $10,000 are also required to enroll in E-
Verify.  IIRAO § 4C-D.
18
regains its license one business day after it submits an affidavit
affirming that it has terminated the unlawful worker.  IIRAO §
4B(6).  If a business is found to have employed two or more
unauthorized aliens at one time, it must also confirm its
enrollment in E-Verify in order to recover its license.   IIRAO7
§ 4B(6)(b).  If a business entity violates the IIRAO a second
time, Hazleton suspends its license for a minimum of twenty
days and reports the violation, whether or not eventually
corrected, to the federal government.  IIRAO § 4B(7).
The IIRAO further creates a private cause of action
against businesses that employ unlawful workers.  Section 4E of
the IIRAO makes it “an unfair business practice” for a business
entity to discharge “an employee who is not an unlawful
worker,” if, on the date of the discharge, “the business entity
was not participating in [E-Verify] and the business entity was
employing an unlawful worker.”  IIRAO § 4E(1).  An employee
 Even an employee who is properly terminated for cause8
(or without cause in the case of an employee at will) has a cause of
action under this provision.  The ordinance uses “lost” wages as a
measure of “damages.”  IIRAO § 4E(2).
 The IIRAO defines an “illegal alien” as “an alien who is9
not lawfully present in the United States, according to the terms of
United States Code Title 8, section 1101 et seq.”  IIRAO § 3D.
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discharged under these conditions may sue the business entity
under the IIRAO for treble actual damages, as well as
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.   IIRAO § 4E(2).8
The IIRAO also addresses the “harboring” of persons
lacking lawful immigration status.  Section 5 makes it “unlawful
for any person or business entity that owns a dwelling unit in the
City to harbor an illegal alien in the dwelling unit, knowing or
in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to,
entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law.”9
IIRAO § 5A.  “Harboring” is broadly defined.  The ordinance
states: “to let, lease, or rent a dwelling unit to an illegal alien .
. . shall be deemed to constitute harboring.”  IIRAO § 5A(1).
Additionally, Section 7 of the IIRAO makes legal immigration
status a condition precedent to entering into a valid lease.
IIRAO § 7B.  All leases entered into by persons lacking lawful
status are deemed breached.  Id.
 This five business day period is tolled if the property10
owner acquires further information about the tenant and requests a
secondary verification from the federal government of the tenant’s
immigration status, or if the property owner tries to evict the tenant
(continued...)
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The mechanisms for enforcing the housing provisions of
the IIRAO are similar to those set forth above for enforcing the
employment provisions.  Thus, any City resident may file a
complaint with Hazleton’s Code Enforcement Office alleging
that a property owner is illegally “harboring” a tenant who is an
“illegal alien.”  IIRAO § 5B(1).  Once such a complaint is
received, the Code Enforcement Office may request identifying
information about the named tenant from the property owner,
and the property owner must provide that information within
three days.  IIRAO § 5A(3).  The City then verifies the legality
of the tenant’s immigration status with the federal government,
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c).  IIRAO § 5B(3).  
If the federal government confirms that the tenant lacks
lawful immigration status, the IIRAO gives the property owner
five business days to evict that tenant.  IIRAO § 5B(4).  If the
owner fails to do so, the City suspends the owner’s rental license
and bars the owner from collecting any rent for the applicable
dwelling unit.   IIRAO § 5B(4)-(5).  These sanctions end one10
(...continued)10
and that tenant challenges the eviction in Pennsylvania state court. 
IIRAO § 7D.
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business day after the owner submits an affidavit affirming that
s/he has corrected the violation.  IIRAO § 5B(6).  Any
subsequent violation subjects the owner to a fine of $250.00 per
day per “adult illegal alien” harbored in a dwelling unit, as well
as suspension of her/his rental license.  IIRAO §§ 5A(2), 5B(8).
2.  The Rental Registration Ordinance
The RO operates in conjunction with the anti-harboring
provisions of the IIRAO.  Section 7 of the RO requires that any
prospective occupant of rental housing over the age of eighteen
apply for and receive an occupancy permit.  RO §§ 1m, 7b.  To
receive that permit, the prospective occupant must pay a ten-
dollar fee and must submit certain documents, including
“[p]roper identification showing proof of legal citizenship
and/or residency” to Hazleton’s Code Enforcement Office.  RO
§ 7b.  Hazleton landlords are required to inform all prospective
occupants of this requirement, and they are prohibited from
allowing anyone over the age of eighteen to rent or occupy a
rental unit, unless that person has a permit.  Id.  
Section 10 of the RO provides that a landlord found
 Eleven plaintiffs filed the operative complaint.  The11
district court dismissed three of them for lack of standing, and that
portion of the district court’s decision is not being appealed.  Of
the eight plaintiffs the district court found to have standing, only
six press their cases on appeal.
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guilty of renting to someone without a permit must pay an initial
fine of $1000 per unauthorized occupant, and an additional fine
of $100 per day per unauthorized occupant until the violation is
corrected.  RO § 10b.  An authorized occupant of rental housing
who is found guilty of permitting someone without a rental
permit to live in her/his apartment must pay the same fine.  Id.
B.  The Plaintiffs
The following six plaintiffs claim that they have standing
to bring this suit: Pedro Lozano, John Doe 1, John Doe 3, John
Doe 7, Jane Doe 5, and the Hazleton Hispanic Business
Association (“Plaintiffs”).   These Plaintiffs include Hazleton11
business entities, landlords, and tenants, as well as an
organization whose members include Hazleton business entities
and landlords.  We briefly describe these Plaintiffs, and the
basic facts underlying each Plaintiff’s claim to standing.
Pedro Lozano is a lawful permanent resident who
immigrated to the United States from Colombia in January 2002.
Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 485-86.  He owns a duplex in
23
Hazleton and rents out half of it to help pay his mortgage.  Id. at
488.  He hires contractors to perform repairs on his property as
needed.  Id. at 489.
John Doe 1 was born in Mexico, and had lived in
Hazleton for six years at the time of trial.  Id. at 486.  He is
unsure of his immigration status, but believes that he could be
removed from the United States.  Id.  He is similarly unsure of
his work authorization.  Id.  John Doe 1's landlord evicted him
because of the risk of being fined pursuant to the
aforementioned provisions of the IIRAO and the RO.  Id. at 497.
John Doe 3 had lived in Hazleton for four years at the
time of trial.  Id. at 486.  He understands his immigration status
to be “illegal,” and he rents an apartment within Hazleton.  Id.
at 497. 
John Doe 7 and Jane Doe 5 were born in Columbia and
had lived in Hazleton for more than five years at the time of
trial.  Id. at 486.  They rent a house in Hazleton, but fear
eviction and being forced to leave Hazleton if the ordinances are
enforced.  Id. at 497.
The Hazleton Hispanic Business Association (“HHBA”)
is an organization of business owners from the Hazleton area
24
that exists to “promote the interest of [its] business members and
to project the image of the Hispanic business community.”  Id.
at 492 (internal quotation marks omitted).  HHBA’s president,
Rudolfo Espinal, owns three rental properties in Hazleton and
hires contractors to perform repairs on those properties as
needed.  Id. at 492-93.
C.  Procedural History
As noted above, numerous plaintiffs filed this action for
injunctive relief based upon challenges to the validity of the
IIRAO and the RO.  Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 485.  The
district court granted these plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary
restraining order, and the parties agreed to extend that order
until the case could be resolved on its merits.  Id.  These
ordinances have never been enforced, and the challenges
asserted are facial.
The amended complaint alleges that the ordinances
violate the Supremacy Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution; 42
U.S.C. § 1981; the federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-
31; plaintiffs' privacy rights; Pennsylvania’s Home Rule Charter
Law, 53 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 2961-67; Pennsylvania’s Landlord
  The district court dismissed the Equal Protection, Fair12
Housing Act, privacy, and Pennsylvania Landlord and Tenant Act
claims, and those portions of its order have also not been appealed.
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and Tenant Act, 68 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 250.101-50.602; and the
limits of Hazleton’s police powers.  Id.
At the conclusion of a nine-day bench trial, the district
court issued a thorough opinion and order permanently enjoining
the City from enforcing the ordinances.  The court concluded
that eight of the eleven plaintiffs had standing to challenge the
IIRAO and the RO, and that it was appropriate for the John and
Jane Doe Plaintiffs to proceed anonymously.  The court held
that the IIRAO and the RO violate the Supremacy and Due
Process Clauses of the United States Constitution, as well as 42
U.S.C. § 1981.  The court also held that Hazleton, as a City of
the Third Class, lacked authority under Pennsylvania’s Home
Rule Charter Law to create the IIRAO’s private cause of action,
and that it exceeded its police powers in enacting these
ordinances.   12
This appeal followed.  Hazleton argues that Plaintiffs
lack standing, and that the district court abused its discretion
both in permitting the John and Jane Doe Plaintiffs to proceed
anonymously and in issuing a confidentiality order prohibiting
26
Hazleton from disclosing the Doe Plaintiffs’ identity
information to the federal government.  Hazleton further
contends that Plaintiffs’ claims are meritless, and that the
ordinances are valid under federal and state law. 
III.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331 and 1367.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.
We review a district court’s conclusions of law de novo
and its factual findings for clear error.  See, e.g., McCutcheon v.
Am.’s Servicing Co., 560 F.3d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 2009).  We
review a district court’s grant of a motion to proceed
anonymously and grant of a confidentiality order for abuse of
discretion.  Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 371
& n.2 (3d Cir. 2008).
IV.  SEVERABILITY AND STANDING
We first address the threshold question of Plaintiffs’
standing.  Here, however, standing implicates the issue of
severability – an issue which has yet to be explicitly discussed
in this suit.  As we explained in Contractors Ass’n v. City of
Philadelphia, “[c]ourts considering constitutional challenges to
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statutes often analyze standing problems in terms of the
severability doctrine. . . . The severability doctrine governs
whether [plaintiffs] have standing to challenge [an] entire
[o]rdinance, or just [certain provisions].”  6 F.3d 990, 996 (3d
Cir. 1993).
Severability, however, like any non-jurisdictional issue,
can be waived, and it is clear that Hazleton has, with one
exception, waived issues of severability here.  The district court
considered whether Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the
“employment provisions” and the “housing provisions” of these
ordinances as collective wholes, and conducted its merits
inquiries accordingly.  See, e.g., Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 518
(“[T]he ordinances at issue have two distinct provisions, one
directed to employment issues and one aimed at landlord/tenant
issues, [and] we will discuss each topic separately with regard
to pre-emption.”).  On appeal, Hazleton does not contest the
district court’s failure to further sever the ordinances.  Rather,
Hazleton’s brief characterizes the ordinances the same way the
district court did.  Thus, Hazleton argues that Plaintiffs lack
standing to challenge the “employment provisions” and the
“housing provisions,” and that the “employment provisions” and
 We note that Hazleton’s waiver of this issue likely speaks13
to the merits of a severability analysis as well, as severability often
turns significantly on intent.  If Hazleton had truly intended each
provision of the IIRAO and the RO to operate independently, and
to stand or fall independently of the other provisions of this
regulatory scheme, it surely would have pressed that point
sometime during this litigation.  It has not done so. 
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the “housing provisions” are not pre-empted, without further
differentiating among those provisions.  13
The sole severability issue Hazleton has not waived
concerns the IIRAO’s private cause of action.  Hazleton has
argued that the private cause of action is severable from the rest
of the IIRAO’s “employment provisions” both in its brief and at
oral argument.   Severability of a local ordinance is a question
of state law, and Pennsylvania law favors severability.
Contractors Ass’n, 6 F.3d at 997.  Additionally, there is a
presumption in favor of severability where, as here, the
ordinances contain a severability provision.  Id.   For an
ordinance to be severable, “[t]he legislating body must have
intended that the act or ordinance be separable and the statute or
ordinance must be capable of separation in fact.  The valid
portion of the enactment must be independent and complete
within itself.”  Saulsbury v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 196 A.2d 664,
667 (Pa. 1964) (emphasis omitted).  
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Here the IIRAO’s severability provision indicates that
Hazleton’s City Council did intend the private cause of action
provision to be severable from the balance of its regulatory
scheme.  Furthermore, the private cause of action is not
intertwined with the other “employment provisions,” most of
which concern business licensing requirements.  It can operate
independently and is “capable of separation in fact.”  Id.  We
therefore conclude that it is severable.  Accordingly, we will
evaluate Plaintiffs’ standing to challenge the IIRAO’s private
cause of action independently of their standing to challenge the
other “employment provisions” and the “housing provisions.”
In essence, the question of standing asks “whether the
litigant[s] [are] entitled to have the court decide the merits of the
dispute.”  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).  As we
will explain, we conclude that there is at least one Plaintiff with
standing to challenge the employment and housing provisions of
these ordinances.  Accordingly, we must consider the merits of
the challenges to those provisions.  See Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 53 n.2
(2006) (“[T]he presence of one party with standing is sufficient
to satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.”).
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However, as we will also explain, we find that no Plaintiff has
standing to challenge the IIRAO’s private cause of action.
Accordingly, review of the legality of that provision must await
a challenge by a plaintiff who can establish an Article III injury.
A.  General Principles of Standing
The irreducible minimum of any standing inquiry derives
directly from Article III of the United States Constitution.  See
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
Article III limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to “Cases” and
“Controversies.”  U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; see also Lujan, 504
U.S. at 559-60.  The judicial power established by Article III is
therefore not “an unconditioned authority to determine the
constitutionality of legislative or executive acts.”  Hein v.
Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 598 (2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Rather, federal courts are
permitted to address these questions only if actually adjudicating
“the rights of individuals.”  Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).  Thus, the inquiry into standing must focus on whether
a claim is being brought “by a party whose interests entitle him
to raise it.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  A plaintiff’s
“interests” satisfy Article III when the following three elements
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are present:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in
fact – an invasion of a legally protected interest
which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b)
actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical.  Second, there must be a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of – the injury has to be fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not the result of the independent
action of some third party not before the court.
Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (internal citations, quotation marks,
and alterations omitted). 
In addition to these constitutionally required elements of
standing, federal courts have developed a body of self-imposed
limitations on the exercise of their judicial power.  See Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004); see
also Oxford Assocs. v. Waste Sys. Auth., 271 F.3d 140, 145 (3d
Cir. 2001).  Accordingly, “[e]ven in cases concededly within our
jurisdiction under Article III,” we will decline to decide the
merits of a case when these “prudential standing” requirements
are not satisfied.  Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. at 11.
Prudential standing encompasses: “the general prohibition on a
litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring
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adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately
addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement
that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests
protected by the law invoked.”  Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
751 (1984).
An organization wishing to bring suit on behalf of its
members must satisfy a specific combination of constitutional
and prudential standing requirements.  See United Food and
Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517
U.S. 544, 556-57 (1996) (explaining that the first two prongs of
the associational standing test are constitutional, while the third
prong is prudential).  To establish that it has “associational
standing” and can represent its members’ interests in federal
court, an organization must show that:
(a) its members would otherwise have standing to
sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to
protect are germane to the organization’s purpose;
and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested requires the participation of individual
members in the lawsuit.
Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343
(1977).
Here, Plaintiffs claim that Lozano and the HHBA have
 Assuming the other requirements of associational14
standing are met, one member with standing is sufficient for an
organization to have standing.  See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 342 (“[A]n
association may have standing solely as the representative of its
(continued...)
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standing to challenge the employment provisions of the IIRAO,
and that Lozano, the HHBA, and the Doe Plaintiffs have
standing to challenge the housing provisions of the IIRAO and
the RO. 
B.  Constitutional Standing
1.  The Employment Provisions
As discussed above, the IIRAO’s employment provisions
require businesses to submit affidavits affirming that they do not
utilize the services of unlawful workers; incentivize, and in
certain circumstances mandate, the use of E-Verify; create
procedures for adjudicating independently of federal law
whether a business has employed an unauthorized alien; and
penalize a business for doing so by suspending its business
license. 
The district court held that Lozano had standing to
challenge these provisions for himself, and that the HHBA had
standing to challenge them on behalf of its member, Rudolfo
Espinal.   Lozano is a landlord, and Espinal is a landlord and14
(...continued)14
members. . . . The association must allege that its members, or any
one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a
result of the challenged action of the sort that would make out a
justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit.”)
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(emphasis added).
 The employment provisions of the IIRAO regulate the15
behavior of all “business entities,” a term which as we noted
above, is defined expansively and includes even those entities that
do not have or need business licenses.  At the same time,
compliance with these provisions is primarily, although not
entirely, coerced through regulating the provision of business
licenses.  Lozano and Espinal are plainly business entities under
the IIRAO; however, neither has testified as to whether he has a
business license.  
We agree with the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
when faced with the same issue in Gray v. City of Valley Park, 567
F.3d 976 (8th Cir. 2009), that this does not deprive them of
standing.  Regardless of whether these Plaintiffs have business
licenses, the IIRAO applies to them as business entities, and they
“must, as law-abiding citizens, comply and conform their conduct
according to [the ordinance’s] directives.”  Id. at 985; see also id.
at 986 (“At the very least, as a business entity covered by the
ordinance, [plaintiffs] may not knowingly recruit, hire for
employment, or continue to employ, an unlawful worker to
perform work within the City.  And, when a valid complaint is
lodged, [plaintiffs] would be required to . . . provide identity
information to the . . . Code Enforcement Office.”) (internal
citation omitted).
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owner of a real estate agency.  Both are business entities under
the IIRAO,  and both sometimes hire contractors to perform15
work on their rental properties.  Accordingly, the district court
found that they faced imminent concrete injury, because if the
IIRAO were enforced, they would be compelled “to comply
with [its] employer requirements . . . adding a burden of time
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and expense to [their] operations.”  See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d
at 489.  Hazleton challenges the district court’s conclusion on
several grounds.
Hazleton’s primary argument on appeal is that the
“injury” these Plaintiffs face is nothing more than the “cost of
compliance” with the IIRAO, and that this is a generalized
burden insufficiently particularized to satisfy the injury-in-fact
requirement of Article III.  It is well-established that an injury
must be particularized to support standing.  A “particularized”
injury is one that “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and
individual way,”  Alston v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 585 F.3d
753, 763 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1)
(internal quotation marks omitted), and is established when a
plaintiff shows that s/he has “sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining some direct injury . . . and not merely that
[s/]he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people
generally,” Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v.
Reagan, 786 F.2d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 1986) (internal quotation
marks omitted).  
Thus, the Supreme Court has rejected attempts by
taxpayers to bring suits challenging the government’s use of tax
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dollars.  For instance, in Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447
(1923), the Supreme Court held that a taxpayer lacked standing
to challenge a federal appropriations act that she alleged
violated the Tenth Amendment.  The Court explained that the
harm a taxpayer suffers when the government unlawfully uses
taxpayer funds is “shared with millions of others [and]
comparatively minute and indeterminable.”  Id. at 487.  Because
such an injury is a matter “of public and not of individual
concern,” it is not particularized, and therefore insufficient to
give rise to Article III standing.  Id.  The Court has reaffirmed
this conclusion many times since, explaining that:
a plaintiff raising only a generally available
grievance about government – claiming only harm
to his and every citizen’s interest in proper
application of the Constitution and laws, and
seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly
benefits him than it does the public at large – does
not state an Article III case or controversy.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74.
Hazleton attempts to transpose these principles into a
quite different context.  Hazleton suggests that because all
business entities in Hazleton are required to comply with the
IIRAO, the burden of complying with the ordinance is
“generalized” and not “particularized.”  Accordingly, it argues
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that Lozano and Espinal – and presumably all business entities
in Hazleton – lack standing to challenge the IIRAO’s provisions
affecting them.  The argument could not be more misguided.  
Plaintiffs here are not members of the general public
complaining of some indefinite and indeterminable harm, such
as the unconstitutional expenditure of their tax-dollars.  Rather,
Lozano and Espinal are direct targets of an ordinance they allege
to be unconstitutional, complaining of what that ordinance
would compel them to do.  Thus, the appropriate comparison is
not to taxpayers seeking invalidation of government
expenditures, but to taxpayers seeking invalidation of taxes
imposed on them.  As the Supreme Court explained in Hein, 551
U.S. at 599, it is incontrovertible that taxpayers in this second
category have standing: “[o]f course, a taxpayer has standing to
challenge the collection of a specific tax assessment as
unconstitutional; being forced to pay such a tax causes a real and
immediate economic injury to the individual taxpayer.”  
Furthermore, Hazleton’s insistence that these Plaintiffs
lack standing because their injuries are widely-shared (at least
among business entities in Hazleton) is misplaced.  The fact that
an injury is widely-shared is not the primary focus of the
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particularized inquiry.  See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524
U.S. 11, 23-24 (1998).  As the Supreme Court explained in
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (“SCRAP”), 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973), “[t]o deny
standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because many
others are also injured, would mean that the most injurious and
widespread Government actions could be questioned by nobody.
We cannot accept this conclusion.”  The question of particularity
turns on the nature of the harm, not on the total number of
persons affected.
Lozano and Espinal will not suffer in some “indefinite
way in common with people generally” if the IIRAO is
enforced.  Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 488.  Rather, they will be
affected in a “personal and individual way” by what the IIRAO
requires of them.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 n.1.  Enforcement of
the IIRAO would create coercive pressures compelling them to
investigate the work authorization status of the prospective
contractors they seek to hire.  Additionally, they would be
required to submit affidavits to Hazleton’s Code Enforcement
Office affirming that they do not knowingly utilize the services
of “unlawful workers.”  Failure to comply with either directive
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could result in significant sanctions.  These costly requirements,
imposed directly and purposefully on these Plaintiffs, are a
particularized injury-in-fact.
Hazleton also argues that even if the “cost of
compliance” is a theoretically sufficient injury under Article III,
these Plaintiffs fail to show that the cost of compliance with the
IIRAO is greater than the cost of compliance with federal law.
Thus, argues Hazleton, these Plaintiffs fail to show that there
would be any actual cost of compliance with the IIRAO itself.
Hazleton is mistaken.  Federal law certainly does not require
anyone to submit an affidavit to Hazleton’s Code Enforcement
Office.  Though relatively small, that cost is sufficient for
standing purposes.  “[A]n identifiable trifle is enough for
standing.”  See SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 689 n.14 (internal quotation
marks omitted).  
The IIRAO is also much broader than federal law, and
coerces as well as incentivizes different behaviors.  Lozano and
Espinal testified that they only hire workers to perform discrete
repair projects on their rental properties as needed.  See J.A.
1116, 1122 (Lozano has “problems with [his] roof” and intends
to hire “a contractor” to make repairs.); J.A. 1216, 1221 (Espinal
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intends to hire someone to do “plumbing” and “electrical”
repairs as part of the ongoing renovations of his rental
properties.  He also anticipates hiring someone for tasks such as
“shoveling snow.”).  Such workers would almost certainly be
considered independent contractors under federal law.  As we
discuss in greater detail below, the federal requirement that
employers verify the work authorization status of their
employees does not apply to independent contractors.  Thus,
federal law would not require either Lozano or Espinal to
determine such persons’ work authorization status.  In contrast,
the IIRAO prohibits Plaintiff business owners from
“permit[ting], dispatch[ing], or instruct[ing] any person who is
an unlawful worker to perform work” (regardless of whether the
person is an employee or an independent contractor), and thus
compels them to verify the work authorization of any worker
whose services they utilize.  IIRAO § 4A; see also J.A. 1444.
Therefore, we reject Hazleton’s attempt to refute the standing of
Lozano and Espinal by arguing that the IIRAO imposes no
burdens beyond those imposed by federal law.  It clearly does.
Lozano and Espinal have established that if the IIRAO is
enforced, it will cause them particularized injury redressable by
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this court.  Since the employment provisions of the IIRAO apply
to independent contractors, Lozano and Espinal (and therefore
the HHBA) have standing to challenge those provisions.
However, it is much less clear whether the private cause of
action applies to independent contractors, and we must
separately evaluate whether Lozano or Espinal have standing to
challenge that provision
2.  Private Cause of Action
Unlike the other employment provisions of the IIRAO,
which impose restrictions on a business entity not only when it
“hire[s] for employment, or continue[s] to employ” an
employee, but also whenever it “permit[s], dispatch[es], or
instruct[s] any person . . . to perform work,” IIRAO § 4A, the
private cause of action on its face affords rights only to an
“aggrieved employee.”  IIRAO § 4E (emphasis added).  Under
Section 4E of the IIRAO, it is an “unfair business practice” for
a business entity to terminate “any employee who is not an
unlawful worker” while it continues to employ an unlawful
worker.  Id.  If it does so, the business entity is liable to the
“aggrieved employee” for treble damages.  Id.  Whereas the rest
of the IIRAO speaks of “workers,” the section creating the
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private cause of action appears to inure solely to the benefit of
“employees.”
Lozano and Espinal have not testified that they currently
employ anyone who would be considered an “employee,” nor
has either testified about any intent to do so.  Moreover, even if
they had – or even if we were to construe this section as also
inuring to the benefit of discharged independent contractors –
Lozano and Espinal have not testified that they have plans to
hire more than one person, employee or contractor, at any one
time, and the record is insufficient to support such a finding.
Yet, the IIRAO’s private cause of action arises only if at least
two persons work for the same business entity at the same time.
Additionally, unlike other provisions they testified about,
Lozano and Espinal did not testify that they fear prosecution
under the private cause of action provision or that they have any
reason to fear such prosecution.
We realize, of course, that the threat of future prosecution
can certainly be a sufficiently “imminent” injury to support
Article III standing.  See Pa. v. W. Va., 262 U.S. 553, 593
(1923) (“One does not have to await the consummation of
threatened injury to obtain preventive relief.”).  However, that
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threat must be more than a possibility dependent on multiple
contingencies that may never occur.  See, e.g., Caribbean
Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 675 (9th Cir.
1988) (explaining that fears of liability reliant on multiple
contingencies do not give a plaintiff standing).  Lozano and
Espinal would be injured by Section 4E of the IIRAO only if
they proceeded to hire multiple employees, terminated one while
retaining another, and were sued by (or had reason to fear suit
by) the terminated employee.  This attenuated sequence of
events is not even suggested by this record, and it is therefore
too tenuous to support a conclusion that either has the requisite
personal interest to establish a “case” or “controversy.”
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to consider the merits of these Plaintiffs’ challenges
to the IIRAO’s private cause of action.
3.  Housing Provisions
The housing provisions of the IIRAO prohibit the
knowing or reckless harboring of “illegal aliens” (defined to
include the knowing or reckless provision of rental housing);
subject landlords who violate this prohibition to significant
monetary sanctions; and invalidate any lease entered into by
44
persons lacking lawful immigration status.  The RO requires all
persons over the age of eighteen who seek to live in rented
property to obtain an occupancy permit; makes possession of
documentation of lawful immigration status a requirement for
receiving that permit; prohibits landlords from renting to
persons who lack a permit; and subjects landlords who do so to
suspension of their rental license and a concomitant prohibition
on collecting rent from the dwelling units involved. 
The district court held that Lozano, the HHBA (again on
behalf of its member Espinal), and the Doe Plaintiffs have
standing as landlords and tenants to challenge the housing
provisions of the IIRAO and the RO.
a.  Landlord Plaintiffs
The district court concluded that landlords Lozano and
Espinal had suffered a constitutionally sufficient injury-in-fact
because the housing provisions made it more difficult for them
to rent apartments.  The court also concluded they had standing
because Hazleton’s enforcement of the housing provisions
would directly impose certain requirements on them, costing
them both time and money.  See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 488-
89.  Hazleton contests the court’s conclusions on several
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grounds.
Hazleton first argues that the record fails to support the
district court’s finding that the housing provisions made it more
difficult for Lozano and Espinal to rent their properties.
According to Hazleton, the record reveals that the landlords had
the same “mixed success” in renting apartments both before and
after passage of the ordinances.  Hazleton’s Br. 23.  Hazleton
therefore claims that Lozano and Espinal have suffered no injury
at all.  We cannot agree.
The district court’s finding that both Lozano and Espinal
had more difficulty finding tenants for their properties following
passage of the IIRAO and the RO is supported by the record,
and certainly not clearly erroneous.  Lozano testified that tenants
who had been renting from him since he acquired his rental
property in 2005 “ran away” upon learning about the ordinances
in mid-2006.  J.A. 1108.  Lozano further testified that he has
been able to find tenants only sporadically since then, and that
at least one prospective tenant, who had been quite interested in
an apartment, reacted with concern and quickly departed after
Lozano informed him about the requirements of the IIRAO and
the RO.  J.A. 1111-12.  Espinal similarly testified that he has
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had more difficulty in renting apartments since passage of the
ordinances, and that on at least one occasion, he showed an
apartment to potential tenants, who “were going to take [it],” but
after telling these applicants about the ordinances, “they never
called [him] back.”  J.A. 1215.  The record therefore supports
the district court’s conclusion that Lozano and Espinal suffered
sufficient injury to establish Article III standing.
Hazleton next argues that even if Lozano and Espinal did
lose tenants and rental income because of these ordinances, such
an injury is not “legally cognizable” because landlords have no
right to rent to illegal aliens.  Hazleton makes the rather
hyperbolic metaphor of comparing these Plaintiffs to “drug
dealers” asserting a claim to the proceeds of their unlawful
activity.  The City states: “[j]ust as a drug dealer has no legally-
cognizable interest in income derived from violations of federal
drug laws, a landlord has no legally-cognizable interest in
income derived from continuing violations of federal
immigration law.”  Hazleton’s Br. 24.  Hazleton’s comparison
is as regrettable as it is unsound.
It is unfortunate that we must point out that there is no
evidence in the record that the prospective tenants who chose
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not to rent from Plaintiffs were here unlawfully, as Hazleton’s
argument presumes.  There are certainly other reasons why such
invasive ordinances might dissuade a prospective tenant from
renting in Hazleton.  However, even if we were to assume that
all deterred tenants were here unlawfully, we would still
conclude that Plaintiffs assert an injury cognizable under the
law.
By comparing landlords to persons who sell drugs in
direct contravention of federal law, Hazleton distorts both the
applicable law and the interests these Plaintiffs assert.  Federal
law simply does not prohibit landlords from renting (in the
ordinary course of business) to persons who lack lawful
immigration status.  Nor does federal law directly prohibit
persons lacking lawful status from renting apartments.  As we
discuss in further detail below, there is a federal prohibition
against “harboring” of aliens lacking lawful presence.  However,
this prohibition is not nearly so broad as Hazleton’s, and has
never been held to apply to a landlord who does nothing more
than rent to a tenant who happens to be here unlawfully.  In light
of these realities, we think the interest that these Plaintiffs assert
is more appropriately characterized as an interest in continuing
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to operate their rental businesses consistent with the less costly
mandates of federal law, and that is an interest which supports
Article III standing.
Hazleton also argues that these Plaintiffs fail to establish
that the IIRAO and the RO caused whatever injury they have
suffered because actions of independent third-parties (the
potential tenants) are responsible for that injury, not the
ordinances themselves.  Hazleton draws its argument from the
discussion of causation in Lujan.  There, the Supreme Court
explained that when the “plaintiff is himself an object” of a
challenged government action, “there is ordinarily little question
that the action . . . has caused him injury, and that a judgment .
. . will redress it.”  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561-62.  However, when
a plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the
government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or
lack of regulation) of someone else, much more is
needed.  In that circumstance, causation and
redressability ordinarily hinge on the response of
the regulated (or regulable) third party to the
government action or inaction – and perhaps on
the response of others as well. . . . Thus, when the
plaintiff is not himself the object of the
government action or inaction he challenges,
standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily
substantially more difficult to establish.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Hazleton contends that the landlord Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this
higher burden.  
In Pitt News v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 354 (3d Cir. 2000), we
discussed when the regulation of a third-party “causes” a
plaintiff’s injury for the purposes of Article III.  There,
Pennsylvania had amended its Liquor Code to impose criminal
sanctions on businesses that advertised alcoholic beverages in
publications directed at educational institutions.  The Pitt News,
a student-run newspaper at the University of Pittsburgh, sued to
enjoin enforcement of this amendment, and asserted standing
based on the fact that its advertising revenues had suffered
because of advertisers’ compliance with the law.  The district
court held that “indirect economic effects resulting from a
regulation aimed at third parties” were insufficient to give The
Pitt News standing.  Id. at 358.
In reversing that ruling, we explained that the advertisers
would not have cancelled their contracts with The Pitt News
were it not for the regulation.  The fact that advertisers would
cancel their contracts, thereby reducing advertising revenues,
“was not only reasonably foreseeable when the Commonwealth
decided to enact and enforce [the Act], it was the very goal of
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the statute.”  Id. at 361 (internal citation omitted).  Accordingly,
we concluded that the injury the newspaper suffered was “fairly
traceable” to enforcement of the statute against its advertisers.
The situation in Pitt News is analogous to the situation
here.  The housing provisions of the IIRAO and the RO have
already deterred certain renters from contracting for housing
with Lozano and Espinal, and these ordinances will continue to
deter other renters if they are enforced.  This deterrence “was
not only reasonably foreseeable” when Hazleton enacted these
ordinances, it was Hazleton’s “very goal.”  Id. The injuries
Lozano and Espinal assert are a direct, predictable, and
anticipated consequence of the regulation.  Accordingly, their
injuries are “fairly traceable” to the ordinances.
Moreover, Hazleton’s argument ignores that Lozano and
Espinal are not just directly impacted by the ordinances, but
directly regulated as well.  The housing provisions of the IIRAO
and the RO regulate both tenants and landlords.  Although the
injury on which Hazleton focuses, the injury of lost rental
income, is caused by the requirements imposed on tenants, the
district court found, and we certainly agree, that these landlords
would be equally injured by the requirements the IIRAO and the
 We note, however, that the RO explicitly exempts from16
its registration and license requirements those “[p]roperties which
consist of a double home, half of which is let for occupancy and
half of which is Owner-occupied as the Owner’s residence.”  RO §
11d.  At trial, Lozano testified that he owns a “two-family” home. 
J.A. 1107.  He lives in one unit with his family, and rents out the
other unit, which is subdivided into two separate apartments, to
help him pay the mortgage.  See J.A. 1107-08.  To our knowledge,
the parties have not raised whether the “double home” exception
applies to Lozano, and the district court did not address the issue. 
If that exception does apply, Lozano could not establish a sufficient
injury to challenge the RO.  See Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp.
of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 405 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that
because standing is a jurisdictional issue, it cannot be waived, and
the court must, when necessary, consider it sua sponte).  However,
even assuming that Lozano is exempt from the RO, other Plaintiffs
would still have standing to challenge that ordinance, and we
therefore would still have jurisdiction to review it.
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RO impose on them.  Thus, even if we agreed with all of
Hazleton’s arguments thus far, we would still conclude that
Lozano and Espinal have standing.  The housing provisions of
the IIRAO and the RO regulate the ability of landlords to
contract with certain persons.  They require landlords to explain
the ordinances to all prospective renters and to examine those
renters’ occupancy permits.  More generally, they compel
landlords to act as local enforcers of immigration law in ways
that far exceed their obligations under federal law.  Compliance
with these requirements elevates the cost of doing business as a
landlord, and that alone gives them Article III standing.  16
 Hazleton does not extend this argument to John Doe 1,17
which is wise since John Doe 1 was evicted by his landlord
because of these ordinances.  See J.A. 831-32.  Hazleton does
challenge John Doe 1's standing, however, based on its contention
that John Doe 1 is lawfully present in this country.  We recognize
that the record contains conflicting testimony as to John Doe 1's
immigration status.  On the one hand, John Doe 1 testified that his
father, a United States citizen, submitted a “petition” to make John
Doe 1 a “legal resident,” and that the United States government
approved that petition.  J.A. 808-09.  On the other hand, John Doe
1 testified that he is unsure of his immigration status and his work
authorization, that he believes he is removable, and that he is “not
here legally.”  See J.A. 809-10, 832.  We therefore cannot conclude
(continued...)
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b.  Tenant Plaintiffs
Because “[t]he loss (or imminent loss) of one’s apartment
and the inability to rent a new one is certainly an actual and
concrete injury,” caused by the ordinances and
 redressable by the court, the district court concluded that the
Doe Plaintiffs, who lack lawful immigration status, also have
standing to challenge the housing provisions of the IIRAO and
the RO.  Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 497-98. 
Hazleton first argues that the district court erred in
finding that John Does 3 and 7 and Jane Doe 5 face imminent
injury.  According to Hazleton, their fears of eviction are merely
conjectural because “none of them have been evicted or have
received any threat or warning that they might be evicted in the
future.”   Hazleton’s Br. 20.  We are entirely unconvinced.17
(...continued)17
that the district court’s findings as to the legitimacy of his fears
were clearly erroneous.  Regardless of John Doe 1's precise legal
status, we think that he has established standing.  He has been
evicted because of the ordinances, and his own understanding of –
and his ability to prove – his status is sufficiently uncertain that he
is quite likely to suffer further injury if the ordinances are enforced.
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These Plaintiffs all testified that they feared losing their
apartments and having to move elsewhere.  See J.A. 888, 929,
951.  Hazleton cites John Doe 3's testimony that he did not
expect to be evicted because his landlord “doesn’t care much
about” the ordinances, J.A. 888, as evidence that he faces no
imminent injury.  However, Hazleton misconstrues this
testimony.  John Doe 3 later explained that he had been told by
his landlord’s agent that his landlord did not expect the
ordinances to ever go into effect, and for that reason, John Doe
3 had been unconcerned.  See J.A. 889-90.  He also testified that
he has no reason to believe that his landlord would not comply
with the ordinances if they are enforced.  J.A. 889-90.  Given
the harsh sanctions the IIRAO and the RO would impose on any
landlord who rented to him or the other Doe Plaintiffs, such
fears are plainly well-founded.  The possibility of eviction is
therefore much more than “conjecture.”  A plaintiff need only
show “a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result
54
of the statute’s operation or enforcement,” and the Doe Plaintiffs
clearly do so.  Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442
U.S. 289, 298 (1979).
Hazleton also raises here the converse of its argument
above: it contends that the Doe Plaintiffs lack standing because
their claimed injuries would be caused by third-party landlords,
and not the ordinances.  This verges on the ridiculous.  Just as
Hazleton’s ordinances compel tenants not to rent from Plaintiff
landlords, they compel landlords not to rent to Plaintiff tenants.
The Doe Plaintiffs’ fears that their landlords will not rent to
them – because the IIRAO and the RO require those landlords
not rent to them – are certainly “fairly traceable” to the
ordinances.  Additionally, as Hazleton well knows, these
ordinances directly regulate tenants as well, and therefore would
injure the Doe Plaintiffs regardless of their landlords’ reactions
to them.  The IIRAO and the RO would invalidate their leases,
and would require them to pay a fee and provide documentation
(which they lack) in order to continue renting apartments in
Hazleton.  These injuries easily satisfy Article III.
Finally, Hazleton argues that the Doe Plaintiffs fail to
establish redressability because, even if this Court struck down
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the ordinances, the Doe Plaintiffs would still be subject to
removal.  According to Hazleton, this Court cannot grant “a
remedy that takes the Doe [P]laintiffs out of legal jeopardy.
They will still be in violation of federal law and subject to
removal.”  Hazleton’s Br. 21.  Hazleton greatly overstates the
demands of this element of constitutional standing.
As the Supreme Court explained in Larson v. Valente,
456 U.S. 228, 243 n.15 (1982), “a plaintiff satisfies the
redressability requirement when he shows that a favorable
decision will relieve a discrete injury to himself.  He need not
show that a favorable decision will relieve his every injury.”
Redressability therefore does not require that a court be able to
solve all of a plaintiff’s woes.  Rather, we need only be able to
redress, to some extent, the specific injury underlying the suit.
See Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 (2007) (holding that
redressability prong was satisfied because risk of global climate
change would be reduced “to some extent” by relief requested).
By permanently enjoining enforcement of the housing
provisions of the IIRAO and the RO, this court can provide
meaningful redress for the injury the Doe Plaintiffs assert.  Such
relief would substantially decrease the likelihood that they will
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be evicted and/or unable to procure rental housing while they
remain in the United States.  That is more than sufficient to
establish standing.
Because Lozano, HHBA member Espinal, and the Doe
Plaintiffs will suffer injury caused by the ordinances and
redressable by the court, we conclude that they have Article III
standing to challenge the housing provisions of the IIRAO and
the RO.
C.  Prudential Standing    
Even when a plaintiff satisfies Article III standing
requirements, federal courts may nonetheless decline to consider
that plaintiff’s claims for prudential reasons.  Hazleton contends
that there are two prudential considerations which counsel
restraint here. 
Hazleton first argues that Plaintiffs lack prudential
standing because they do not fall within the “zone of interests”
protected by federal immigration law.  Hazleton misstates the
applicable zone of interests inquiry in the pre-emption context.
The Supreme Court has explained that a plaintiff may
bring suit only when the interests s/he asserts are “arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
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statute or constitutional guarantee in question.”  Ass’n of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
 This limitation on standing arose in suits challenging agency
action under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5
U.S.C. § 702, but has since been employed more broadly.  See
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997) (The “zone-of-
interests test [was first applied] to suits under the APA, but later
cases have applied it also in suits not involving review of federal
administrative action and have specifically listed it among other
prudential standing requirements of general application.”)
(internal citations omitted).  However, outside of the
administrative law context, the test may have different
permutations, see Conte Bros. Auto., Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick
50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 226 (3d Cir. 1998), and “the breadth of
the zone of interests [will vary] according to the provisions of
law at issue,” Bennett, 520 U.S. at 163.
Thus, in the pre-emption context, we have explained that
the relevant prudential inquiry is not whether a plaintiff’s
interests fall within the zone protected by the allegedly pre-
empting federal provision, in this case, federal immigration law.
In St. Thomas-St. John Hotel & Tourism Ass’n v. Virgin Islands,
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218 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2000), several employer organizations
brought suit to enjoin a Virgin Islands law establishing that
employees could only be terminated for cause.  The plaintiffs
alleged that this law was pre-empted by the National Labor
Relations Act (“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169.  On appeal,
defendants argued that plaintiffs lacked prudential standing to
invoke the pre-emptive effect of the NLRA, because the
NLRA’s zone of interests did not encompass employers’
interests in terminating their employees.  We agreed with the
defendants’ characterization of the NLRA’s zone of interests,
but found this no bar to employers’ prudential standing.  We
explained: 
We know of no governing authority to the effect
that the federal statutory provision which
allegedly preempts enforcement of local
legislation by conflict must confer a right on the
party that argues in favor of preemption.  On the
contrary, a state or territorial law can be
unenforceable as preempted by federal law even
when the federal law secures no individual
substantive rights for the party arguing
preemption. 
Id. at 241. 
Pre-emption suits arise under the Supremacy Clause and
vindicate the interests of that Clause, not the interests of the pre-
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empting federal provision.  Therefore, the appropriate prudential
inquiry in pre-emption cases (if any such inquiry is necessary at
all) must be whether the plaintiff’s interests fall within the zone
protected by the Supremacy Clause itself.  See, e.g., Wilderness
Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., 581 F.3d 1198, 1217 n.11 (10th Cir. 2009)
(declining to decide if zone of interests test applies in pre-
emption cases, but emphasizing that if it does, “the relevant
zone of interest is that of the Supremacy Clause and not of the
allegedly preempting federal statute”); Pharm. Research & Mfrs.
v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 73 (1st Cir. 2001) (In a pre-emption
case, “it is the interests protected by the Supremacy Clause, not
by the preempting statute, that are at issue.”).  These interests,
which are no less than our society’s interest in a working
federalism, are societal, not individual.  Accordingly, all
Plaintiffs fall within their breadth, and have prudential standing
here.
Hazleton also argues that we should, as a matter of
prudential standing, refuse to adjudicate the Doe Plaintiffs’
claims because they concede that they lack lawful immigration
status.  Hazleton relies on National Coalition of Latino Clergy,
Inc. v. Henry, No. 07-CV-613, 2007 WL 4390650 (N.D. Okla.
 As a general rule, we do not consider arguments arising18
out of unpublished decisions, and do so here solely for the
purposes of putting to bed Hazleton’s argument, which we find
particularly troubling.
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Dec. 12, 2007), the unpublished decision of a lone federal
district court as support for its contention.   18
In Henry, the District Court for the Northern District of
Oklahoma considered challenges to the Oklahoma Taxpayer and
Citizen Protection Act of 2007, a law which mirrors the IIRAO
in several respects (and which, in subsequently-filed litigation,
Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742 (10th Cir.
2010), was preliminarily enjoined in part).  The court concluded
that those plaintiffs lacking lawful immigration status had
Article III standing, but nonetheless held that it would not
consider their claims for prudential reasons.  Explaining that
courts have traditionally refused to entertain cases brought by
plaintiffs with “unclean hands,” it reasoned that the “illegal alien
Plaintiffs seek nothing more than to use this Court as a vehicle
for their continued unlawful presence in this country.”  Id., at
*9.  To allow them to do so, the court concluded, would make
it an “abetter of iniquity,” a result it found “unpalatable.”  Id.
The court thus adopted “a new, and narrow, prudential
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limitation” on standing:
[a]n illegal alien, in willful violation of federal
immigration law, is without standing to challenge
the constitutionality of a state law, when
compliance with federal law would absolve the
illegal alien’s constitutional dilemma –
particularly when the challenged state law was
enacted to discourage violation of the federal
immigration law.
Id. 
Hazleton argues that, for the reasons articulated in Henry,
we “too must prudentially decline to take jurisdiction with
respect to the Doe Appellees.”  Hazleton’s Br. 19.  Henry’s
invented bar to judicial access is entirely improper, and we will
not accept Hazleton’s invitation to duplicate that error here.
The Henry decision, both in substance and tone, fails to
appreciate that whatever a person’s immigration status, “an alien
is surely a ‘person’” entitled to Due Process Clause protections.
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210; see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 579 (1974) (“The right of access to the courts . . . is
founded in the Due Process Clause and assures that no person
will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary
allegations concerning violations of fundamental constitutional
rights.”).  The Supreme Court therefore has certainly considered
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judicial challenges brought by persons lacking lawful
immigration status, see, e.g., Plyler, even when “compliance
with federal law” would have absolved “the illegal alien’s
constitutional dilemma,” Henry, 2007 WL 4390650, at *9. 
Henry defends its rule by claiming that it would not deny
persons without lawful status all access to the courts, as they
would retain prudential standing to sue for harms unrelated to
their status.  But this caveat assures little.  As this case
demonstrates, all it takes for a harm to become “related to” a
person’s immigration status is for some legislative body to
decree it so.  The scope of these aliens’ rights would therefore,
under Henry’s reasoning, be entirely dependent on the will of
state and local legislatures, which could tie any consequence of
their choosing to unlawful status and never face judicial review.
The Doe Plaintiffs satisfy Article III standing
requirements, and the prudential standing requirements of
general applicability set forth by the Supreme Court.
Accordingly, we will address their claims.  However, two more
preliminary issues must be resolved before we do so.
V.   ANONYMITY AND CONFIDENTIALITY
Hazleton argues that the district court erred in permitting
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those Plaintiffs lacking lawful immigration status to proceed
using a “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” pseudonym.  We  disagree.
In C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, we explained that although
“the use of pseudonyms to conceal a plaintiff’s identity has no
explicit sanction in the federal rules,” the Supreme Court has
“given the practice implicit recognition.”  527 F.3d at 371 n.2.
We thus concluded that “the decision whether to allow a
plaintiff to proceed anonymously rests within the sound
discretion of the court.”  Id.
In deciding whether to permit those Plaintiffs with
concerns about the legality of their immigration status to
proceed anonymously, the district court surveyed case law
within this Circuit and identified nine separate factors courts
have used to decide whether anonymity is appropriate.  See
Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 506.  The court then engaged in a
thorough analysis of each of these factors, and concluded that
the factors favoring anonymity outweighed those favoring
disclosure.  Specifically, the court found that ethnic tensions had
escalated in Hazleton since enactment of the ordinances, and
that the named Plaintiffs had been harassed and intimidated for
 Lozano, for example, testified that hate mail was sent to19
his home three separate times.  One letter “contained a clipping
from a newspaper describing the [alleged] effects of illegal
immigration as well as a picture of a ‘warrior’ wearing ‘a huge
Mexican hat.’  Scrawled near this picture were the phrases,
‘[s]ubhuman spic scum’ and ‘[i]f it is brown, flush it down.’” 
Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 510 (alterations in original) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).  This letter also contained a
link to a website proclaiming itself “the Official Home Page of the
National Socialist Movement, an organization dedicated to the
preservation of our Proud Aryan Heritage, and the creation of a
National Socialist Society in America and around the world.”  Id.
at 510 n.34 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The district court
noted that this sort of harassment extended even to people who
were merely perceived as being connected to the lawsuit, even if
this perception was not rooted in fact.  Amilcar Arroyo, a United
States citizen who publishes a Hazleton-based Spanish-language
newspaper, was publically harassed when he tried to cover a rally
in support of the ordinances.  Based on a rumor that he was a
plaintiff in this suit, rally participants gathered around him
shouting, “get out of the country” and “traitor.”  Id. at 510 (internal
quotation marks omitted).  Police escorted Arroyo from the rally
for his own protection.  Id.
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their involvement in this litigation.   See id. at 508-10.  The19
court concluded that the Doe Plaintiffs, because of their
unlawful status, would face an “exponentially greater” risk of
harassment, and even physical danger, if their identities were
revealed.  Id. at 510.  The court also noted that the litigation was
in the public interest, and reasoned that the Doe Plaintiffs, as
well as prospective litigants lacking lawful status, would be
deterred from bringing cases clarifying constitutional rights, if
doing so required alerting federal immigration authorities to
their presence.  See id. at 511-12.  Finally, the court explained
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that because the Doe Plaintiffs’ identity information was not
central to their claims, restricting Hazleton’s access to that
information would not be prejudicial.  See id. at 513.  We agree
with each of these conclusions, and think it clear that given the
environment in Hazleton following enactment of these
ordinances, the court did not abuse its discretion in permitting
the Doe Plaintiffs to proceed using pseudonyms.  
Relatedly, Hazleton also argues that the district court
violated 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) by entering an order prohibiting the
parties from disclosing “information obtained during discovery
regarding the John and Jane Doe plaintiffs.”  J.A. 211.  Section
1373(a) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal,
State, or local law, a Federal, State, or local
government entity or official may not prohibit, or
in any way restrict, any government entity or
official from sending to, or receiving from, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service
information regarding the citizenship or
immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any
individual.
8 U.S.C. § 1373(a).  Hazleton argues that because the district
court is an entity of the  federal government, it was prohibited
by this section from preventing Hazleton from communicating
with federal immigration authorities about “the citizenship or
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immigration status” of the Doe Plaintiffs.
Although we are not convinced that § 1373(a) does, or
could, limit the inherent powers of federal courts in the way
Hazleton suggests, we need not reach this question because
Hazleton’s argument fails for a more fundamental reason.
Under the confidentiality agreement the parties eventually
entered into, the Doe Plaintiffs agreed to reveal their identities
only to Hazleton’s attorneys, and not to Hazleton officials.  See
J.A. 692-707.  Consequently, Hazleton never learned these
Plaintiffs’ identities or their immigration status.  The district
court simply could not have prohibited Hazleton from
communicating with the federal government about information
that Hazleton never knew.
VI.  DISCUSSION
Having resolved these preliminary issues, we can turn to
the merits of the claims before us.  Although our reasoning
differs from that of the district court, we agree that the
provisions of the ordinances which we have jurisdiction to
review are pre-empted by federal immigration law and
unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause.  Because that
conclusion turns on the relationship between the ordinances and
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federal immigration law, we begin our inquiry into the merits of
this appeal by briefly laying out the parameters of that law.
A.  Federal Immigration Law
1.  The Immigration and Nationality Act
The primary body of federal immigration law is
contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101-537, enacted in 1952, and amended many times
thereafter.  The INA sets forth the criteria by which “aliens,”
defined as “any person not a citizen or a national of the United
States,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3), may enter, visit, and reside in
this country.
Under the INA, there are three primary categories of
aliens who may lawfully enter and/or spend time within the
United States: (1) “nonimmigrants,” who are persons admitted
for a limited purpose and for a limited amount of time, such as
visitors for pleasure, students, diplomats, and temporary
workers, see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15); (2) “immigrants,” who are
persons admitted as (or after admission, become) lawful
permanent residents of the United States based on, inter alia,
family, employment, or diversity characteristics, see 8 U.S.C. §
1151; and (3) “refugees” and “asylees,” who are persons
 Congress has also ratified treaties pursuant to which20
persons may be admitted on humanitarian grounds even if they do
not satisfy the statutory definition of “refugee” set forth in the INA. 
See United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 3, Apr. 18,
1988, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
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admitted to and permitted to stay for some time in the United
States because of humanitarian concerns, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157-
58.   Aliens wishing to be legally admitted into the United20
States must satisfy specific eligibility criteria in one of these
categories, and also not be barred by other provisions of federal
law that determine inadmissibility.  Congress has determined
that non-citizens who, inter alia, have certain health conditions,
have been convicted of certain crimes, present security concerns,
or have been recently removed from the United States, are
inadmissible, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182, and if detained when
attempting to enter or reenter the country, may be subject to
expedited removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1225. 
Despite the carefully designed system for lawful entry
described above, persons lacking lawful immigration status are
obviously still present in the United States.  As the Supreme
Court explained almost thirty years ago: “[s]heer incapability or
lax enforcement of the laws barring entry into this country . . .
 Prior to 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service21
(“INS”), which operated under the Department of Justice,
administrated both immigration services and immigration
enforcement.  On March 1, 2003, Congress abolished the INS. 
Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
296, 116 Stat. 2135, that agency’s functions were transferred to
three separate agencies within the newly created Department of
Homeland Security: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(“USCIS”), which performs immigration and naturalization
services, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”),
which enforces federal immigration and customs laws, and U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), which monitors and
secures the country’s borders.  Older documents may continue to
refer to the pre-2003 administrative structure, and citations to them
should be understood in that context.
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has resulted in the creation of a substantial ‘shadow population’
. . . within our borders.”  Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218.  Such persons
may lack lawful status because they entered the United States
illegally, either by failing to register with immigration
authorities or by failing to disclose information that would have
rendered them inadmissible when they entered.  See 8 U.S.C. §
1227.  In addition, aliens who entered legally may thereafter lose
lawful status, either by failing to adhere to a condition of
admission, or by committing prohibited acts (such as certain
criminal offenses) after being admitted.  See id. 
Persons here unlawfully are subject to removal from the
country.  Removal proceedings are initiated at the discretion of
the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).   See Juarez v.21
 As noted above, inadmissible aliens detained at the22
borders of the United States, or others deemed not to have been
“admitted” to the country, may be subject to expedited removal. 
See 8 U.S.C. § 1225.  In addition, expedited removal procedures
apply to certain aliens already within the country who have been
convicted of congressionally-defined crimes.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1228.
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Holder, 599 F.3d 560, 566 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he decision
when to initiate removal proceedings is committed to the
discretion of immigration authorities.” (citing Reno v. Am.-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489 (1999))).
Although certain aliens are subject to more expedited removal
proceedings,   for all others, section 240 of the INA sets forth22
the “sole and exclusive procedure for determining whether an
alien may be admitted to the United States or, if the alien has
been so admitted, removed from the United States.”  8 U.S.C. §
1229a(a)(3).  
Under section 240, an alien facing removal is entitled to
a hearing before an immigration judge and is provided numerous
procedural protections during that hearing, including notice, the
opportunity to present and examine evidence, and the
opportunity to be represented by counsel (at the alien’s
expense).  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.  At the conclusion of a removal
hearing, the presiding immigration judge must decide, based on
 In Zadvydas, the Court addressed the cases of two aliens23
who had been ordered removed from the United States, but who,
for various reasons, no other country would accept.  The
government sought to continue detaining them nonetheless.  The
(continued...)
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the evidence produced during the hearing, whether the alien is
removable, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A), and if so, whether
s/he should be ordered removed, or should be afforded relief
from removal.  Such relief can include postponement of
removal, cancellation of removal, or even adjustment of status
to that of lawful permanent resident.  See 8 U.S.C. §§
1229a(c)(4), 1229b.
In sum, while any alien who is in the United States
unlawfully faces the prospect of removal proceedings being
initiated against her/him, whether s/he will actually be ordered
removed is never a certainty until all legal proceedings have
concluded.  Moreover, even after an order of removal issues, the
possibility remains that no country will accept the alien.  Under
such circumstances, the Constitution limits the government’s
authority to detain someone in anticipation of removal if there
is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future.  See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699
(2001).23
(...continued)23
Court held that the Due Process Clause imposed reasonableness
limits on post-removal-period detention, and thus that the
government could not continue the aliens’ detention indefinitely if
there was “no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future.”  533 U.S. at 701.
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The INA, as amended, also prohibits the “harboring” of
aliens lacking lawful immigration status.  It provides that any
person who “knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an
alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in
violation of law, conceals, harbors, or shields from detection .
. . such alien in any place, including any building or any means
or transportation” shall be subject to criminal penalties.  8
U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). 
For decades, the INA contained no specific prohibition
against the employment of aliens lacking legal status.  Rather,
regulation of the employment of aliens not lawfully present was
at most a “peripheral concern.”  DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351,
360 (1976).  This changed in 1986, when Congress amended the
INA through enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control
Act (“IRCA”), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified at
8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a-1324b).  IRCA “forcefully made combating
the employment of illegal aliens central to the policy of
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immigration law.”  Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002)
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).  
2.  The Immigration Reform and Control Act
IRCA regulates the employment of “unauthorized
aliens,” a term of art defined by the statute as those aliens
neither “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” nor
“authorized to be . . . employed by this chapter or by the
Attorney General.”  8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3).  IRCA makes it
unlawful to knowingly hire or continue to employ an
unauthorized alien, or to hire anyone for employment without
complying with the work authorization verification system
created by the statute.  8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)-(2).   This
verification system, often referred to as the “I-9 process,”
requires that an employer examine certain documents that
establish both identity and employment authorization for new
employees.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b).  The employer must then
fill out an I-9 form attesting that s/he reviewed these documents,
that they reasonably appear to be genuine, and that to the best of
the employer’s knowledge, the employee is authorized to work
in the United States.  See id.  Although employers are required
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to verify the work authorization of all employees, Congress did
not extend this requirement to independent contractors.  See 8
U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1) (making unlawful the knowing
“employment” of an unauthorized alien, and the hiring of an
employee for “employment” without verifying the employee’s
work authorization); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(f) (specifically excluding
“independent contractors” from the definition of “employee”);
8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(g) (specifically excluding a “person or entity
using . . . contract labor” from the definition of “employer”).
The I-9 “verification system is critical to the IRCA
regime.”  Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 147-48.  Not
only is failure to use the system illegal, but use of the system
provides an affirmative defense to a charge of knowingly
employing an unauthorized alien.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(3).
Thus, employers who use the I-9 process in good faith to verify
the work authorization of employees are presumed not to have
knowingly employed someone unauthorized to work in this
country.  In enacting IRCA, Congress required the President to
monitor the security and efficacy of this verification system.  See
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(d).  Congress also imposed limits on the
President’s ability to change it.  Id.
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In addition to relying on the I-9 verification system,
IRCA uses public monitoring, prosecution, and sanctions to
deter employment of unauthorized aliens.  IRCA provides for
the creation of procedures through which members of the public
may file complaints about potential violations; it authorizes
immigration officers to investigate these complaints; and it
creates a comprehensive hearing and appeals process through
which complaints are evaluated and adjudicated by
administrative law judges.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(1)-(3).  
Under IRCA, an employer who knowingly hires an
unauthorized alien shall be ordered to cease and desist the
violation, and to pay between $250 and $2000 per unauthorized
alien for a first offense, between $2000 and $5000 per
unauthorized alien for a second offense, and between $3000 and
$10,000 per unauthorized alien for a third or greater offense.  8
U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4).  An employer who fails to verify the work
authorization of its employees can be ordered to pay between
$100 and $1000 for each person whose authorization it failed to
authenticate.  8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(5).  Employers who engage
in a “pattern or practice” of hiring unauthorized aliens shall be
fined up to $3000 per unauthorized alien, imprisoned for not
  8 U.S.C. § 1324b provides in relevant part that:24
[with certain limited exceptions, it] is an unfair immigration-related
employment practice for a person or other entity to discriminate
against any individual (other than an unauthorized alien, as defined
in section 1324a(h)(3) of this title) with respect to the hiring, or
recruitment or referral for a fee, of the individual for employment or
the discharging of the individual from employment – (A) because of
such individual's national origin, or (B) in the case of a protected
individual . . . because of such individual's citizenship status. 
8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a).  Any person adversely-affected by an unfair
immigration-related employment practice “may file a charge
respecting such practice or violation.”  8 U.S.C. § 1324b(b)(1).  
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more than six months, or both.  8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f)(1).  
IRCA expressly pre-empts states and localities from
imposing additional “civil or criminal sanctions (other than
through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or
recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.”
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2).
Because of its concern that prohibiting the employment
of unauthorized aliens  might result in employment
discrimination against authorized workers who appear to be
foreign, Congress included significant anti-discrimination
protections in IRCA.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b.   The statute24
provides that, with certain limited exceptions, it is an “unfair
immigration-related employment practice” to discriminate in
hiring on the basis of national origin or citizenship status.  8
 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(c) provides in relevant part that “[t]he25
President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, a Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair
Employment Practices.”  8 U.S.C. § 1324b(c)(1).  The Special
Counsel “shall be responsible for investigation of charges and
issuance of complaints under this section and in respect of the
prosecution of all such complaints before administrative law
judges.”  8 U.S.C. § 1324b(c)(2).
 There are some differences between the two sections. 26
The imposition of monetary sanctions under § 1324a is mandatory,
but discretionary under § 1324b.  Compare 8 U.S.C. §
1324a(e)(4)(A) with 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(g)(2)(B)(iv).  Also, criminal
penalties are available for certain pattern-or-practice violations
under § 1324a, but not available under § 1324b.  See 8 U.S.C. §
1324a(f)(1).  In contrast, § 1324b provides for compensatory relief,
such as backpay and other remedies, which is not available under §
1324a.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(g)(2)(B)(iii) and (vii)-(viii).
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U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1).  Congress put teeth into this provision by
creating the office of a “Special Counsel” to investigate and
prosecute such offenses, and it required that the President fill
that position “with the advice and consent of the Senate.”  8
U.S.C. § 1324b(c).   Congress also authorized immigration25
judges to punish those who violate IRCA’s anti-discrimination
mandate by imposing civil fines equivalent in amount to those
imposed for knowingly hiring unauthorized aliens.  Compare 8
U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A)(i)-(iii) with 8 U.S.C. §
1324b(g)(2)(B)(iv)(I)-(III).26
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3.  The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act
In 1996, Congress again amended the INA by enacting
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act (“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified
as amended in various sections of 8 U.S.C.).  In IIRIRA,
Congress directed the Attorney General, and later the Secretary
of Homeland Security, to conduct three “pilot programs of
employment eligibility confirmation” in an attempt to improve
upon the I-9 process.  IIRIRA § 401(a), 110 Stat. 3009-655.
Congress mandated that these programs be conducted on a trial
basis, for a limited time period, and in a limited number of
states.  See IIRIRA § 401(b)-(c), 110 Stat. 3009-655-66.  Two
of these trial systems were discontinued in 2003.  However, the
third – originally known as the “Basic Pilot Program” but since
renamed “E-Verify” – was reauthorized and expanded to all fifty
states in 2003.  See Basic Pilot Program Extension and
Expansion Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-156, §§ 2, 3, 117 Stat.
1944.  It has been reauthorized several times since, and its
current authorization will expire, absent congressional action, on
September 30, 2012.  See Department of Homeland Security
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Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-83, § 547, 123 Stat.
2177; Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-329, Div.
A, § 143, 122 Stat. 3580.
E-Verify allows an employer to actually authenticate
applicable documents rather than merely visually scan them for
genuineness.  When using E-Verify, an employer enters
information from an employee’s documents into an internet-
based computer program, and that information is then
transmitted to the Social Security Administration and/or DHS
for authentication.  See IIRIRA, as amended, § 403(a)(3).  These
agencies confirm or tentatively nonconfirm whether the
employee’s documents are authentic, and whether the employee
is authorized to work in the United States.  See IIRIRA, as
amended, § 403(a)(4).  If a tentative nonconfirmation is issued,
the employer must notify the employee, who may contest the
result.  See id.  If an employee does not contest the tentative
result within the statutorily prescribed period, the tentative
nonconfirmation becomes a final nonconfirmation.  See id.  If
the employee does contest it, the appropriate agencies undertake
additional review and ultimately issue a final decision.  See id.
 Pursuant to an executive order by President George W.23
Bush, certain federal government contractors are now also required
to use E-Verify.  See Exec. Order No. 13,465, 73 Fed. Reg. 33,286
(Jun. 6, 2008). 
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An employer may not take any adverse action against an
employee until it receives a final nonconfirmation.  See id.
However, once a final nonconfirmation is received, an employer
is expected to terminate the employee, or face sanctions.
With only a few exceptions, federal law makes the
decision of whether to use E-Verify rather than the default I-9
process entirely voluntary.  See IIRIRA, as amended, § 402(a).
Federal government employers and certain employers previously
found guilty of violating IRCA are currently required to use E-
Verify; all other employers remain free to use the system of their
choice.   See IIRIRA, as amended, § 402(e).  Significantly, in23
enacting IIRIRA, Congress specifically prohibited the Secretary
of Homeland Security from requiring “any person or other entity
to participate in [E-Verify].”  See IIRIRA, as amended, § 402(a).
Congress also directed the Secretary to publicize the “voluntary
nature” of the program and to ensure that government
representatives are available to “inform persons and other
entities that seek information about [E-Verify] of [its] voluntary
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nature.”  IIRIRA, as amended, § 402(d). 
Those employers who elect to use E-Verify and actually
do use the system to confirm an employee’s authorization to
work are entitled to a rebuttable presumption that they did not
hire that employee knowing that s/he lacks authorization to work
in this country.  See IIRIRA, as amended, § 402(b)(1).
Employers who elect to use E-Verify, but in practice continue to
use the I-9 process, are not entitled to the E-Verify rebuttable
presumption, but can still claim the I-9 affirmative defense.  See
IIRIRA, as amended, § 402(b)(2).
B.  State and Local Immigration Laws
As we noted at the outset, state and local attempts to
regulate issues related to immigration have skyrocketed in recent
years.  According to the National Conference of State
Legislatures (“NCSL”), 300 bills pertaining to immigration were
introduced in state legislatures in 2005, and thirty-eight of them
were enacted into law.  National Conference on State
Legislatures, 2009 State Laws Related to Immigrants and
I m m i g r a t i o n  J a n u a r y  1 - D e c e m b e r  3 1 ,  2 0 0 9 ,
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=19232 (last visited Aug.
20, 2010).  Less than five years later, these numbers had
 In fact, Hazleton’s mayor got the idea of enacting the24
IIRAO and the RO from similar ordinances, considered but never
passed, in San Bernardino, California.  See J.A. 1385-87. 
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increased more than five-fold: in 2009, over 1,500 bills
pertaining to immigration were introduced.  From these, 222
laws were enacted, and 131 resolutions adopted.  Id.
A number of these laws contain provisions that are either
identical, or similar, to provisions in Hazleton’s ordinances.24
In their brief filed on behalf of Plaintiffs, Amici Curiae
Chambers of Commerce note that Arizona, Mississippi,
Oklahoma, Utah, Tennessee, Louisiana, West Virginia,
Colorado, Minnesota, Georgia, and Rhode Island, as well as the
municipalities of Valley Park, Missouri; Mission Viejo,
California; Beaufort County, South Carolina; and Apple Valley,
California, have all enacted laws that in some way regulate
either the procedures employers must undertake in order to
avoid hiring unauthorized aliens, or the penalties that can be
imposed for doing so.  In addition, Plaintiffs call our attention
to several localities, including Escondido, California and the
City of Farmers Branch, Texas, which have passed ordinances
regulating the provision of rental housing to aliens not lawfully
present in the United States.
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Various challenges have been leveled at these enactments
– most commonly, attacks rooted in the Supremacy Clause – and
the resulting body of case law informs our analysis.  The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, affirming a decision by the
District Court for the District of Arizona, upheld an Arizona
statute requiring all employers within the state to use E-Verify,
and subjecting businesses that employ unauthorized aliens to a
graduated series of sanctions up to and including the permanent
revocation of their business licenses.  That court rejected the
plaintiffs’ pre-emption and due process claims.  See Chicanos
Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009),
cert. granted, 78 U.S.L.W. 3065 (Jun. 28, 2010) (No. 09-115).
The District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri also
upheld an employment ordinance virtually identical to the
IIRAO against pre-emption, due process, and equal protection
challenges, as well as challenges based on state law.  See Gray
v. City of Valley Park, No. 4:07CV00881, 2008 WL 294294
(E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008), aff’d on other grounds, 567 F.3d 976
(8th Cir. 2009).  
In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
partially affirmed a preliminary injunction issued by the District
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Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, barring
enforcement of certain provisions of an Oklahoma law on pre-
emption grounds. Much like the IIRAO, that law required
employers in Oklahoma to verify the work authorization of
independent contractors, and also created a private cause of
action against business entities that employ unauthorized aliens.
See Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742 (10th
Cir. 2010).
The District Courts for the Southern District of California
and the Northern District of Texas have held that ordinances
similar to the housing provisions of the IIRAO and the RO are
pre-empted.  See Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers
Branch (“Farmers Branch III”), ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, Nos.
3:08-cv-1551-B, 3:03-cv-1615, 2010 WL 1141398 (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 24, 2010); Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers
Branch (“Farmers Branch II”), 577 F. Supp. 2d 858 (N.D. Tex.
2008); Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (S.D.
Cal. 2006).
C.  Pre-emption 
As we have explained, the district court entered the
challenged injunction because it concluded that the IIRAO and
 Plaintiffs present a facial challenge to these ordinances. 25
In Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican
Party, the Supreme Court explained:
Under United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739
(1987), a plaintiff can only succeed in a facial
challenge by “establish[ing] that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid,” i.e. that the law is unconstitutional in all of
its applications.  Id. at 745.  While some Members
of the Court have criticized the Salerno formulation,
all agree that a facial challenge must fail where the
statute has a “plainly legitimate sweep.” 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 739-40
and n.7 (1997).
552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008) (alteration in original).  Based on this
language, Hazleton insists that we must apply the Salerno standard
to Plaintiffs’ claims under the Supremacy Clause.  However, since
both Washington State Grange and Salerno involved quite
different constitutional challenges than the ones we consider here,
it is not at all clear that Salerno applies.  Nonetheless, it is clear
that solely “hypothetical conflicts” between state and local
enactments and federal law are usually insufficient to support a
finding of pre-emption.  See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co.,
485 U.S. 293, 310 (1988).
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the RO, among other failings, are pre-empted by federal law.
Although our reasoning departs from that of the district court,
we agree with its conclusion.   See Johnson v Orr, 776 F.2d 75,25
83 n.7 (3d Cir. 1985) (“An appellate court may affirm a result
reached by the district court on reasons that differ so long as the
record supports the judgment.”).
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution
provides that the laws of the United States “shall be the supreme
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Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”  U.S. Const. art. VI,
cl. 2.  The pre-emption doctrine is a necessary outgrowth of the
Supremacy Clause.  It ensures that when Congress either
expresses or implies an intent to preclude certain state or local
legislation, offending enactments cannot stand.
As this Court has recently noted, “the Supreme Court has
recognized three types of preemption: express preemption,
implied conflict preemption, and field preemption.” Bruesewitz
v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 238-239 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing
Hillsborough County, Fla., v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471
U.S. 707, 713(1985). Both conflict pre-emption and field pre-
emption are types of implied pre-emption.  See, e.g.,
Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
713 (1985).  However, irrespective of the “type” of pre-emption
involved, “the purpose of Congress” is the “touchstone” of any
pre-emption inquiry.  Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1194
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
However, it is important to note that Congress does not
“cavalierly” pre-empt states or municipalities from acting within
the parameters of their historic police powers.  Medtronic, Inc.
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v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).  Accordingly, in pre-emption
inquiries, we assume “that the historic police powers of the
States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”  Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).  When states act beyond the scope of
their historic police powers, however, and wander into “an area
where there has been a history of significant federal presence,”
we do not begin with this assumption of nonpre-emption.
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000).
Express pre-emption occurs when Congress expressly
declares a law’s pre-emptive effect.  See Lorillard Tobacco Co.
v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001).  In such cases, “our task is
to identify the domain expressly pre-empted.”  Id.  In doing so,
we focus in the first instance “on the plain wording of the
[federal statute’s pre-emption] clause, which necessarily
contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.”
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62-63 (2002)
(internal quotation marks omitted).  We also consider the
“structure and purpose of the statute as a whole . . . as revealed
not only in the text, but through [our] reasoned understanding of
the way in which Congress intended the statute and its
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surrounding regulatory scheme to [operate].”  Medtronic, 518
U.S. at 486 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Implied field pre-emption occurs when state or local
governments attempt regulation in a field which Congress has
implied an intent to exclusively occupy.  See English v. Gen.
Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).  Congress’s intent to
occupy a field can be inferred where a federal regulatory scheme
is “so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,” Gade v.
Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992)
(internal quotation marks omitted), or where an Act of Congress
“touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so dominant
that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement
of state laws on the same subject,” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218,  230 (1947). 
Implied conflict pre-emption occurs where it is
“impossible . . . to comply with both state and federal law,”
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted), or where state law “stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress,” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
89
U.S. 52, 67 (1941).  “Impossibility” conflict pre-emption exists
only where it is truly impossible to comply with both federal and
state law.  “Obstacle” conflict pre-emption, on the other hand,
requires a broader inquiry into the purposes underlying a federal
statute, and whether a state law stands as an obstacle to
effectuation of those purposes.  “What is a sufficient obstacle is
a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining the federal
statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended
effects.”  Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363,
373 (2000). 
The Supreme Court has long made clear that federal
interests are paramount in the field of immigration.  The Court
explained seventy years ago: “[t]hat the supremacy of the
national power in the general field of foreign affairs, including
power over immigration, naturalization and deportation, is made
clear by the Constitution was pointed out by authors of The
Federalist in 1787, and has since been given continuous
recognition by this Court.”  Hines, 312 U.S. at 62; see also Toll
v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982). 
However, the Supreme Court has also explained that not
every state or local enactment that affects the rights of aliens
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necessarily interferes with the federal interest in immigration.
In DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), the Supreme Court
articulated a framework for analyzing pre-emption challenges to
state and local laws that impact the rights of aliens but do not
“regulate immigration.”  Although DeCanas was decided a
decade before Congress enacted IRCA and two decades before
it enacted IIRIRA, many aspects of the Court’s analysis are still
relevant to our inquiry.
In DeCanas, the Supreme Court considered whether a
state law prohibiting the employment of persons unlawfully
present was pre-empted by the INA.  California had enacted
legislation prohibiting employers within the state from
“knowingly employ[ing] an alien who is not entitled to lawful
residence in the United States if such employment would have
an adverse effect on lawful resident workers.”  Id. at 352
(internal quotation marks omitted).  A group of migrant
farmworkers sued, arguing that the law was pre-empted both by
the Constitution’s exclusive delegation of the power to regulate
immigration to the federal government, and by the INA.  The
Court disagreed.
In upholding the statute, the Court explained that the
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“[p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively
a federal power” under the United States Constitution,
precluding all state involvement even if Congress has neither
expressed nor implied its intent to preclude that state regulation.
Id. at 354.  “[T]he Constitution of its own force requires pre-
emption” of any state efforts to actually regulate immigration.
Id. at 355.  However, the Court also explained that not “every
state enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a
regulation of immigration and thus per se pre-empted by this
constitutional power.”  Id.  Rather, a state law only regulates
immigration if it is “essentially a determination of who should
or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions
under which a legal entrant may remain.”  Id.  As California’s
law did not intrude into these proscribed areas, the Court held
that it was not pre-empted, absent congressional action.
The Court also held that California’s law was not field
pre-empted by the INA’s regulatory scheme.  First, the Court
explained that “the regulation of employment of illegal aliens”
was not a subject matter of such clear and manifest federal
importance as to require the conclusion that it was occupied by
federal regulation.  Id. at 356.  The Court reasoned that states
 In reaching this conclusion, the Court distinguished cases26
in which pre-emption was found based on the “predominance of
federal interest in the fields of immigration and foreign affairs.” 
DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 363.  It explained that “there would not
appear to be a similar federal interest in a situation in which the
state law is fashioned to remedy local problems, and operates only
on local employers, and only with respect to individuals whom the
Federal Government has already declared cannot work in this
country.”  Id.
92
have “broad authority under their police powers to regulate the
employment relationship to protect workers within the State,”
and that California’s law fell “within the mainstream of such
police power regulation.”  Id.  Because the law “focuse[d]
directly upon the[] essentially local problems [of employing
illegal aliens] and [was] tailored to combat effectively the
perceived evils,” it did not touch upon a field that by its very
nature would support no conclusion but that Congress had
occupied it.   Id. at 357.26
Secondly, the Court concluded that the INA as it then
existed did not reflect clear and manifest congressional intent to
preclude state regulation in the field of employment of aliens
here unlawfully.  Then, the INA was primarily concerned with
“the terms and conditions of admission to the country and the
subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully in the country.”  Id. at
359.  Only one provision of one section of the INA even
 That provision was contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1324, the27
section which makes it a felony to “harbor” illegal entrants, and it
stated that employing aliens here unlawfully “shall not be deemed
to constitute harboring.” DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 360 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
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mentioned the employment of persons not lawfully in the
country.   This evidenced “at best . . . a peripheral concern with27
employment of illegal entrants,” which was insufficient to
establish a congressional intent to occupy the field.  Id. at 360.
To the contrary, the Court believed that Congress had indicated
its intent, through laws addressing farm labor contractors, for
the States to “consistent with federal law, regulate the
employment of illegal aliens.”  Id. at 361. 
The Court did not, however, actually rule on the issue of
conflict pre-emption.  Rather, it remanded the matter so that the
lower courts could determine if California’s law was “consistent
with federal law.”  Id.  In all other respects, though, the Court
found the challenged law an appropriate use of state power,
given both its limited impact upon “immigration” and
Congress’s then limited foray into regulating the employment of
persons lacking lawful immigration status.
In sum, DeCanas holds that the federal authority to
“regulate immigration” is exclusive, but states are not
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necessarily precluded from regulating (consistent with federal
law) certain local issues affecting the rights of aliens, unless
Congress has indicated an intent to preclude such regulation.
1.  Employment Provisions 
a.  Presumption Against Pre-emption
The district court concluded that the employment
provisions of the IIRAO were expressly pre-empted, field pre-
empted, and conflict pre-empted.  Hazleton challenges each of
the district court’s conclusions on multiple grounds.  Hazleton
first claims that the district court erred in failing to apply the
presumption against pre-emption.  We agree.
As we have noted, Congress does not casually sweep
away the historic police powers of states.  This reality underlies
the rebuttable presumption that federal legislation does not pre-
empt those police powers absent “clear and manifest”
congressional intent to the contrary.  Medtronic, 518 U.S. at
485.  Only state and local laws aimed at areas beyond the state’s
historic police powers, that venture into matters long regulated
by the federal government, are not afforded the benefit of this
presumption.  See Locke, 529 U.S. at 108 (“[A]n assumption of
nonpre-emption is not triggered when the State regulates in an
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area where there has been a history of significant federal
presence.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In analyzing the applicability of the presumption in this
case, the district court reasoned that “[i]mmigration is an area of
the law where there is a history of significant federal presence
and where the States have not traditionally occupied the field.
In fact . . . immigration is a federal concern not a state or local
matter.”  Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 518 n.41.  Based on this
reasoning, the district court refused to presume nonpre-emption.
However, the district court’s analysis is inconsistent with the
framework set forth in DeCanas.  
As we noted above, in DeCanas the Supreme Court
explained that not “every state enactment which in any way
deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration.”  424 U.S. at
355 (emphasis added).  Rather, laws regulate immigration only
if they attempt to regulate “who should or should not be
admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a
legal entrant may remain.”  Id.  Hazleton’s employment
provisions therefore plainly do not regulate immigration under
DeCanas.  Rather, they regulate the employment of persons
unauthorized to work in this country, and like the law at issue in
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DeCanas, fall within the state’s historic police powers.
Accordingly, they must benefit from the presumption against
pre-emption.
We are aware, of course, that the landscape of federal
immigration law has changed dramatically since the Court
decided DeCanas.  In enacting IRCA, Congress clearly made
the regulation of the employment of unauthorized aliens a
central concern of federal immigration policy.  However, while
this sea change in the federal regulatory scheme is incredibly
important for purposes of our substantive analysis, it does not
negate the operation of the presumption against pre-emption.
The applicability of the presumption turns on a state’s historic
police powers.  By definition, that means that the presumption
depends on the past balance of state and federal regulation, not
on the present.
As we have just explained, until the passage of IRCA, the
federal government played at most a very small role in
regulating the employment of persons without lawful
immigration status.  See DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 360.  Moreover,
the Supreme Court concluded that Congress then intended for
the states to, “consistent with federal law, regulate the
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employment of illegal aliens.”  Id. at 361.  Thus, when Congress
enacted IRCA, it began legislating in an area in which states had
regulated, and in which the federal government, for the most
part, had not.  Accordingly, we presume that Congress did not
intend to sweep away the states’ historic police powers by
enacting IRCA, absent clear evidence to the contrary.
b.  Express Pre-emption
As noted above, IRCA includes an express pre-emption
clause, which states that: “[t]he provisions of this section
preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal
sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon
those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment,
unauthorized aliens.”  8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2).  Thus, IRCA
expressly pre-empts state and local laws that sanction those who
employ unauthorized aliens, unless the sanction is imposed
through a licensing, or similar, law.  
The district court read this clause as expressly pre-
empting Hazleton’s employment provisions in the IIRAO
because they impose a sanction – the suspension of a business
license – on business entities that employ unauthorized aliens.
Hazleton had argued that the IIRAO is a licensing law, and thus
 In effect, then, the district court believed that a business28
license was not the species of “license” Congress had in mind in
exempting licensing laws from express pre-emption.
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saved from the express pre-emptive reach of IRCA, but the
district court disagreed.  The court reasoned that since the
IIRAO imposes the “ultimate sanction” of entirely taking away
a business’s ability to operate, it is “at odds with the plain
language of the express pre-emption provision, which is
concerned with state and local municipalities creating civil and
criminal sanctions against employers.”   Lozano, 496 F. Supp.28
2d at 519.
The district court also concluded, based on a review of
IRCA’s legislative history, that the IIRAO’s scheme for
revoking licenses is inconsistent with the congressional intent
underlying IRCA’s saving clause.  According to the court,
Congress had no intention, in exempting licensing laws from
express pre-emption, of permitting states and localities to
independently adjudicate whether a business entity has
employed an unauthorized alien.  In reaching this conclusion,
the district court reviewed H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(I), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, the sole piece of IRCA’s legislative
history directly discussing the pre-emption provision.  Based on
 The House Report states: 29
[t]he penalties contained in this legislation are
intended to specifically preempt any state or local
laws providing civil fines and/or criminal sanctions
on the hiring, recruitment or referral or
undocumented aliens.  They are not intended to
preempt or prevent lawful state or local processes
concerning the suspension, revocation or refusal to
reissue a license to any person who has been found
to have violated the sanctions provisions in this
legislation.  Further, the Committee does not intend
to preempt licensing or “fitness to do business
laws,” such as state farm labor contractor laws or
forestry laws, which specifically require such
licensee or contractor to refrain from hiring,
recruiting or referring undocumented aliens.
H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(I), at 12 (emphasis added).  
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several sentences in that Report, the court concluded that
Congress intended the saving clause to only exempt from
express pre-emption local laws that revoke the licenses of
persons who the federal government has found guilty of
violating IRCA, and not the licenses of persons who localities
independently adjudicate guilty of violating their own
prohibitions against employing unauthorized aliens.   Because29
the IIRAO creates its own procedures for adjudicating whether
an employer is guilty of employing unauthorized aliens, and
revokes licenses based on that determination, rather than based
on a federal determination that an employer has violated IRCA,
 License Definition, Merriam-Webster.com,30
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/license (last visited
Aug. 17, 2010). 
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the court concluded that the IIRAO’s employment provisions do
not fall within the scope of IRCA’s saving clause.  See Lozano,
496 F. Supp. 2d at 520.  On appeal, Hazleton renews its
argument that the IIRAO’s employment provisions are a
“licensing” law within the meaning of IRCA’s saving clause,
and we agree.
As noted earlier, the text of IRCA’s express pre-emption
clause explicitly excludes from its pre-emptive scope “licensing
and similar laws.”  Congress did not define these terms.  Terms
that are not statutorily defined are usually ascribed their
“ordinary or natural meaning.”  Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994).
Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines a license as “a
permission granted by competent authority to engage in a
business or occupation or in an activity otherwise unlawful.”30
Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary defines a license as “a
permission, usually revocable, to commit some act that would
otherwise be unlawful.”  Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).
Here, the IIRAO conditions the grant of a business license on a
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business’s agreement not to employ unauthorized aliens, and on
the business’s continued adherence to that agreement.  A
business license certainly falls within the plain meaning of a
“license” and therefore, it seems clear that the IIRAO’s
provisions for suspending such licenses constitute a “licensing
law.”
Plaintiffs nonetheless argue, consistent with the district
court’s decision, that IRCA’s express pre-emption provision
would be toothless if a state or municipality could effectively
circumvent the general prohibition on imposing sanctions by
imposing sanctions of this severity.  According to Plaintiffs, the
loss of a business license is the “death penalty” for a business,
and the express pre-emption clause would be swallowed by its
exception if a law regulating business licenses is held to be a
licensing law.
In support of their argument, Plaintiffs cite several recent
Supreme Court cases which stand for the proposition that courts
should read saving clauses narrowly, and in light of the statutory
scheme as a whole.  See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S.
200, 217 (2004); Geier, 529 U.S. at 870-71; Locke, 529 U.S. at
106.  Looking at IRCA and its purposes more broadly, Plaintiffs
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argue that it is clear that Congress could not have intended the
saving clause to permit states and localities to revoke the
business licenses of employers who employ unauthorized aliens.
The problem with Plaintiffs’ argument, however, is that
even if we look more broadly at IRCA as a whole, there is
simply no basis for wedging the limitation Plaintiffs urge into
the text.  Congress unequivocally states in the saving clause that
licensing laws are not expressly pre-empted by IRCA.  Nowhere
in IRCA’s text or legislative history is there an indication that
Congress intended that clause to apply only to licensing laws
that impose minor penalties, and not to licensing laws that
impose more significant sanctions.  Similarly, there is no
indication that Congress intended to exclude laws regulating the
provision, suspension, and revocation of business licenses from
the term “licensing law,” and Plaintiffs do not offer an
alternative definition of “license” that would sensibly exclude
business licenses.  See Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 865
(finding “no support for [plaintiffs’] interpretation” of the term
“license” as excluding business licenses). 
When statutory language is plain and unambiguous, “the
sole function of the courts . . . is to enforce it according to its
 Plaintiffs also argue that the IIRAO is not a bona fide31
licensing law.  They note that the IIRAO’s title and its “Findings
and Declaration of Purpose” section make no reference to
licensing, and that the IIRAO does not refer to any existing
licensing provisions.  Thus, rather than being a true licensing law
directed towards any legitimate local concerns, Plaintiffs claim that
the IIRAO should be viewed as part of a scheme intended to
regulate immigration by keeping all persons lacking lawful
immigration status out of the City, and by supplanting the federal
government’s role in these matters.  The argument has significant
force, and is very troubling.
This record is not without support for the proposition that,
in enacting both the IIRAO and the RO, the Hazleton City Council
was trying to use every tool at its disposal not merely to address
local concerns with a “purely speculative and indirect impact on
immigration,” DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355, but to alter to the best of
its ability the landscape of federal immigration regulation as well. 
See, e.g., J.A. 1289 (testimony of the President of Hazleton’s City
Council that he intended Hazleton’s ordinances to force the federal
government into action); J.A. 1713 (testimony of Hazleton’s mayor
that the IIRAO is intended “to deter and punish illegal
immigrants”).  Furthermore, it appears that these ordinances were
enacted as part of an organized campaign of certain states and
localities attempting to collectively remedy what they view as the
federal government’s failure to “secure our borders.”  See, e.g.,
J.A. 1438 (testimony of Hazleton’s mayor that he has encouraged
communities across the country to enact similar ordinances).
Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed
how the intent behind a local enactment should factor into a pre-
emption analysis under these circumstances, we do not think the
Hazleton City Council’s intent is irrelevant.  See Plyler, 457 U.S.
at 207 (noting the district court’s determination that the law at
issue had neither “the purpose [n]or effect of keeping illegal aliens
out of the State of Texas”) (internal quotation marks omitted);
DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 354 n.3 (noting disagreement among the
(continued...)
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terms.”  Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004)
(internal quotation marks omitted).  We therefore conclude that
the IIRAO is a licensing law under IRCA’s saving clause and
saved from express pre-emption.31
(...continued)31
California state courts as to whether California’s law was “aimed at
immigration control”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
However, we also realize that the Supreme Court has explained
that states are not “without any power to deter the influx of persons
entering the United States against federal law, and whose numbers
might have a discernable impact on traditional state concerns.” 
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 229 n.23.  
The Supreme Court will undoubtedly speak to this tension
soon, given the number of states and localities attempting to chip
away piece-meal at the federal power to regulate immigration. 
Fortunately, we need not wade into these murky waters in order to
resolve the claims before us.  As we will explain, the employment
provisions are plainly pre-empted, regardless of the intent behind
them, because they pose an obstacle to the careful balancing of
interests underlying IRCA.
 The district court also concluded that the IIRAO’s32
employment provisions are pre-empted because IRCA occupies the
field of “the employment of unauthorized aliens.”  Lozano, 496 F.
Supp. 2d at 524.  This is a broad field indeed, and a difficult
conclusion to sustain given IRCA’s saving clause.  See Int’l Paper
Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 492 (1987) (The existence of a
saving clause “negates the inference that Congress ‘left no room’
(continued...)
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Plaintiffs also argue (consistent with the district court’s
decision) that the IIRAO does not fall within IRCA’s saving
clause because it creates and relies upon its own adjudicative
system for determining whether an employer has employed an
unauthorized alien, rather than relying, as Congress intended, on
the adjudicative system created by IRCA.  Because this
argument is better addressed in the context of the purposes and
objectives underlying IRCA, we attend to it in our discussion of
obstacle conflict pre-emption.32
(...continued)32
for state causes of action.”).  Plaintiffs, however, press the
argument of field pre-emption only in a footnote, and we therefore
consider it waived.  See John Wyeth & Bro., Ltd. v. CIGNA Int’l
Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting, ironically
enough in a footnote, that “arguments raised in passing (such as, in
a footnote), but not squarely argued, are considered waived”).
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c.  Conflict Pre-emption
That the IIRAO’s employment provisions are saved from
express pre-emption does not end our inquiry.  As the Supreme
Court has emphasized, a law that is saved from express pre-
emption is still invalid if it is conflict pre-empted.  See Geier,
529 U.S. at 870-72.  The fact that Congress intends to save a
general class of laws, such as licensing and similar laws, from
express pre-preemption does not mean that Congress intends to
permit any law within that category even if it impedes federal
interests.  A federal law that forecloses conflict pre-emption
analysis is one that “defeat[s] its own objectives.”  Id. at 872.
Congress may intend “such a complex type of state/federal
relationship,” but we will not assume it absent proof.  Id.
Therefore, even though the IIRAO is a licensing law, it cannot
be allowed to operate if compliance with both its employment
provisions and IRCA is impossible, or if those provisions stand
as an obstacle to the objectives underlying IRCA.  In either case,
106
the Supremacy Clause requires that the IIRAO give way.
The district court concluded that the IIRAO’s
employment provisions are pre-empted by IRCA because of the
numerous ways in which they “differ from and conflict with
IRCA.”  Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 529.  Hazleton argues that
the district court erred by conflating “mere difference” with
conflicts sufficient to result in pre-emption.  Hazleton’s Br. 46.
The City correctly argues that conflict pre-emption occurs
only if a “difference” either makes it impossible to comply with
both federal and local law or “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.”  Hines, 312 U.S. at 67; see also Fla.
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141
(1963).  We too have concerns about the district court’s
approach, both because it did at times equate difference with
conflict, and because it failed to anchor its articulation of the
congressional purposes underlying IRCA to that statute’s
language and legislative history.  
Nonetheless, upon a thorough consideration of those
purposes, we agree that the IIRAO’s employment provisions
stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
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federal law, and thus are pre-empted.
As we will explain, it is indisputable that Congress went
to considerable lengths in enacting IRCA to achieve a careful
balance among its competing policy objectives of effectively
deterring employment of unauthorized aliens, minimizing the
resulting burden on employers, and protecting authorized aliens
and citizens perceived as “foreign” from discrimination.  See
Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 767 (IRCA balances the goals of
“preventing the hiring of unauthorized aliens, lessening the
disruption of American business, and minimizing the possibility
of employment discrimination.”).  The IIRAO substantially
undermines this careful balance.  It furthers the first of these
federal objectives at the expense of the others.  This “significant
conflict” is sufficient to rebut the presumption against pre-
emption, see Geier, 529 U.S. at 885, and invalidate these
provisions under the Supremacy Clause.
IRCA was “one of the longest and most difficult
legislative undertakings of recent memory.”  Presidential
Statement on Signing the Immigration Reform and Control Act,
22 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1534 (Nov. 10, 1986).  Over the
course of numerous sessions, Congress debated taking the
 At the time of IRCA’s passage, there was still significant33
opposition to requiring employers to play a role in enforcing the
nation’s immigration policy.  See, e.g., 132 Cong. Rec. H10583-01
(daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of Rep. Martinez) (“For the
first time in history, this bill institutes Federal penalties for private
citizens who hire illegal aliens. . . . [We should] put the burden of
enforcing the law on the Government, where it belongs, not on
private employers.  Not only is this unfair to private employers, but
it will cause them, out of fear, to discriminate against prospective
employees who are ‘foreign-looking.’”).  
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theretofore unprecedented step of directly prohibiting the
employment of “unauthorized aliens.”   Congress ultimately33
committed to enacting employer sanctions, but in so doing,
committed equally to enacting measures that would protect
groups likely to be unfairly burdened by those sanctions –
employers and authorized workers.  IRCA is thus “a carefully
crafted political compromise which at every level balances
specifically chosen measures discouraging illegal employment
with measures to protect those who might be adversely
affected.”  Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc. v. INS, 913
F.2d 1350, 1366 (9th Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 502
U.S. 183 (1991).  
Congress paid considerable attention to the costs IRCA
would impose on employers, see, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(I),
at 43 (“Considerable discussion was generated during the
processing of [this bill] to the effect the employer sanctions
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provisions were placing an undue burden on employers in
requiring them to do the paperwork and keep records on
employees.”), and drafted the legislation in a manner that would
minimize those burdens, see, e.g., 132 Cong. Rec. H10583-01
(daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of Rep. Bryant) (IRCA has
been “carefully designed for the minimum burden necessary . .
. to be effective.”).  
Congress heeded these concerns in crafting IRCA’s
prosecution and adjudication scheme.  For example, it limited
investigation of complaints to those with a “substantial
probability of validity” in order to minimize the possibility of
“harassment” of “innocent employers.”  8 U.S.C. §
1324a(e)(1)(B); S. Rep. No. 99-132, at 35 (1985).  Similarly,
Congress “intended to minimize the burden and the risk placed
on the employer in the verification process.”  Collins Foods
Int’l, Inc. v. INS, 948 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1991).
Accordingly, the I-9 process only requires employers to
ascertain whether employees’ documents appear “on [their] face
to be genuine.”  8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(A)(ii); H.R. Rep. No.
99-682(I), at 16.  Congress could have required employers to
ascertain the actual legitimacy of such documents; it did not. 
110
Just as importantly, Congress strove to ensure that the
prohibition against hiring unauthorized aliens would not result
in discrimination against authorized workers (whether alien or
citizen) who appear “foreign,” as Congress feared that
overcautious employers might incorrectly assume such persons
were unauthorized to work in the United States.  IRCA’s
legislative history could not be more plain or emphatic about the
congressional commitment to preventing this sort of
discrimination.  The House Report explains:
Numerous witnesses over the past three
Congresses have expressed their deep concern
that the imposition of employer sanctions will
cause extensive employment discrimination
against Hispanic-Americans and other minority
group members. . . . [T]he Committee does
believe that every effort must be taken to
minimize the potentiality of discrimination and
that a mechanism to remedy any discrimination
that does occur must be a part of this legislation.
. . . [A]nti-discrimination protections are
essential to this bill.
H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(I), at 22 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (emphasis added).  IRCA is thus “delicately balanced
to serve the goal of preventing unauthorized alien employment
while avoiding discrimination against citizens and authorized
aliens.”  Collins Foods Int’l, 948 F.2d at 554.  As we explained
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earlier, Congress created the office of a Special Counsel to
handle discrimination charges, see 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(c), and
specifically required that the President fill that position, see 8
U.S.C. § 1324b(c)(1).  As also detailed above, Congress
authorized administrative law judges to impose on employers
found guilty of discrimination civil penalties equivalent to the
penalties imposed on employers found guilty of employing
unauthorized aliens.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(g)(2)(B)(iv)(I)-(III).
The Supreme Court has consistently found state and local
laws which alter the careful balancing of objectives
accomplished by a federal law to be pre-empted, and so have
we.  See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
489 U.S. 141, 144 (1989) (finding Florida law pre-empted
because it struck the balance between “the encouragement of
invention and free competition in unpatented ideas” differently
from federal patent law); Rogers v. Larson, 563 F.2d 617, 626
(3d Cir. 1977) (finding Virgin Islands law pre-empted because
it struck the balance between “assur[ing] an adequate labor force
on the one hand and . . . protect[ing] the jobs of citizens on the
other” differently from federal immigration law).  Hazleton’s
IIRAO undermines IRCA’s careful balancing of objectives in at
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least four ways.
First, the IIRAO significantly increases employer burden
by creating a separate and independent adjudicative system for
determining whether an employer is guilty of employing
unauthorized aliens.  Hazleton’s system fails to reflect the same
concern with reducing employer burden as IRCA.  In contrast to
the federal requirement that a complaint have a “substantial
probability of validity,” the IIRAO permits investigation of any
complaint lodged against an employer regardless of its likely
merit.  Under Section 4 of the IIRAO, a complaint is valid so
long as it includes an “allegation which describes the alleged
violator(s) as well as the actions constituting the violation, and
the date and location where such actions occurred.”  IIRAO §
4B.  Upon receipt of any such complaint (so long as it does
allege a violation on the basis of national origin, ethnicity, or
race), Hazleton’s Code Enforcement Office must, “within three
business days, request identity information from the business
entity regarding any persons alleged to be unlawful workers.”
IIRAO § 4B(2)-(3). 
Similarly, the IIRAO provides employers with
substantially fewer procedural protections than IRCA.  Under
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IRCA, an employer must be provided with notice and an
opportunity for a hearing, and an administrative law judge must
find the employer guilty of violating IRCA by a preponderance
of the evidence before any sanctions can be imposed.  See 8
U.S.C. § 1324a(e).  That employer also has a right to an
administrative appeal and judicial review.  See id.  In marked
contrast, the IIRAO requires Hazleton’s Code Enforcement
Office to immediately suspend the business license of a business
entity which fails to provide requested information about alleged
unlawful workers within three business days.  See IIRAO §
4B(3).  Additionally, if a business entity fails to terminate
anyone that Hazleton has decided is an unlawful worker within
three business days, the Code Enforcement Office immediately
suspends its license.  See IIRAO § 4B(4).  A business entity that
has been “subject to a complaint and subsequent enforcement”
can then seek relief in court, but both the procedure and
remedies available to that employer are entirely unclear on the
face of the ordinance.  See IIRAO § 7F.
The crux of this conflict, however, transcends the
differences between the IIRAO’s prosecution and adjudication
system and IRCA’s.  Rather, it is rooted in the fact that Hazleton
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has established an alternate system at all.  As we have
explained, Congress created a comprehensive and carefully
balanced prosecution and adjudication system, and foremost
among its goals in doing so was to minimize the burden this
system would impose on employers.  See Edmondson, 594 F.3d
at 751 (IRCA “exhaustively details a specialized administrative
scheme for determining whether an employer has knowingly
employed an unauthorized alien.”).  We therefore cannot fathom
that Congress intended to tolerate the “supplementing” of its
carefully crafted system with independent state and local
systems, which by their mere existence drastically increase
burdens on employers.  
Under the IIRAO, a business in Hazleton must worry
about two separate systems of complaints, investigations,
prosecutions, and adjudications.  Furthermore, Hazleton’s
ordinance is not the only consideration here, given the emerging
landscape of local and state regulation in the area.  See, e.g.,
Buckman Co. v. Pls.’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001)
(explaining that if one state’s tort system is permitted then
federal law will have to operate “in the shadow of 50 States’ tort
regimes [thereby] dramatically increas[ing] the burdens facing
Although we have been framing this question as one of34
conflict pre-emption, Hazelton’s actions may be subject to field
pre-emption as well.  “Field preemption arises by implication when
state law occupies a ‘field reserved for federal regulation.’
Bruesewitz, 561 F.3d at 238 (citing United States v. Locke, 529
U.S. 89, 111 (2000)).  The categories of pre-emption are not
(continued...)
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potential applicants – burdens not contemplated by Congress”).
If Hazleton’s ordinance is permissible, then each and every state
and locality would be free to implement similar schemes for
investigating, prosecuting, and adjudicating whether an
employer has employed unauthorized aliens.  See Rowe v. N.H.
Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 373 (2008) (reasoning that
allowing one state to implement its own monitoring system
“would allow other States to do the same . . . easily lead[ing] to
a patchwork of state . . . laws, rules, and regulations”).  As noted
above, many states and localities have already tried.  A
patchwork of state and local systems each independently
monitoring, investigating, and ultimately deciding – all
concurrently with the federal government – whether employers
have hired unauthorized aliens could not possibly be in greater
conflict with Congress’s intent for its carefully crafted
prosecution and adjudication system to minimize the burden
imposed on employers.34
(...continued)34
“rigidly distinct. Indeed, field pre-emption may be understood as a
species of conflict pre-emption: A state law that falls within a pre-
empted field conflicts with Congress’ intent (either express or
plainly implied) to exclude state regulation.” English, 496 U.S. at
79 n.5.  If Congress, in service of the goal of minimizing employer
burden, intended for its adjudicative system to be exclusive, IRCA
would occupy the field of prosecuting and adjudicating employers
for the hiring of unauthorized aliens. 
 Throughout its brief, Hazleton makes much of the fact35
that the IIRAO does not actually “coerce” employers to use E-
Verify (or as we discuss later, to verify the work authorization of
independent contractors) because even though safe harbor is
provided only to those employers who use E-Verify, employers are
given the opportunity to terminate an unauthorized alien before
sanctions are imposed, thus making a safe harbor less essential. 
The argument is the proverbial “red herring.” 
It is clear that Hazleton significantly incentivizes use of E-
Verify.  However one characterizes this coercion, it is inconsistent
with congressional intent.  The IIRAO plainly alters the riskiness
of choosing not to use E-Verify (or choosing not to verify the work
authorization of independent contractors).  The anxiety associated
with these choices is itself a burden from which Congress intended
(continued...)
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Second, the IIRAO contravenes congressional objectives
by altering the employment verification scheme created by
IRCA, and supplemented by IIRIRA and subsequent legislation.
While IRCA affords an affirmative defense to any employer
who uses the I-9 process to verify the work authorization of its
employees, the IIRAO does not.  The IIRAO provides its safe
harbor only to employers who use E-Verify.  In this way, the
IIRAO significantly alters the risk calculus for employers, and
coerces use of E-Verify.   The IIRAO also directly compels35
(...continued)35
to protect employers.  See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(I), at 16
(limiting the scope of employers’ responsibilities to reduce the
“concern[s]” of “cautious employers”).
117
City agencies, City contractors, and all employers twice found
guilty of violating the IIRAO to use E-Verify.  These provisions
contradict congressional intent for E-Verify to remain fully
voluntary for the vast majority of employers – a decision that,
once again, balances seeking efficacy in employment
authorization verification with the goals of minimizing employer
burden and preventing employment discrimination.  See Geier,
529 U.S. at 878 (finding state law imposing a specific
requirement conflict pre-empted where Congress “deliberately
sought variety” and to provide “several different” options).
Similarly, they contravene congressional intent for the I-9
process to serve as a universal protection against sanctions.  
As Plaintiffs pointed out at oral argument, if Congress
were solely concerned with ensuring that no unauthorized alien
ever secured employment in the United States, it would have
and could have found a better mechanism for verifying
employment authorization than the I-9 process.  The I-9 process
is not foolproof, and yet it remains the default employment
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verification system twenty-four years after IRCA’s enactment.
This reflects Congress’s determination that E-Verify, which
advances certain federal objectives to the detriment of others, is
not yet appropriate for mandated use.  
At least for certain categories of employees, studies have
shown that E-Verify is more effective than the I-9 process for
determining whether an employee is authorized to work in the
United States.  See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,
Report to Congress on the Basic Pilot Program, June 2004, at
3 (The program “reduced unauthorized employment among
participating employers by permitting employers to determine
whether the information provided by employees on I-9 forms is
consistent with information on SSA and DHS databases.”).
However, because of problems with the relevant databases, E-
Verify has been alarmingly ineffective in verifying the
employment authorization of work-authorized aliens and
naturalized citizens, and thus has effectively resulted in
discrimination against these groups.  See id. (“[T]he tentative
nonconfirmation rate was unacceptably high for foreign-born
work-authorized employees and was higher than desirable for
U.S.-born employees.  This created burdens for employees and
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employers . . . and led to unintentional discrimination against
foreign-born persons.”).  
As of the last congressionally-mandated evaluation of E-
Verify in 2007, foreign-born work-authorized employees were
still thirty times more likely to receive tentative
nonconfirmations than employees born in the United States, see
Westat, Findings of the Web Basic Pilot Evaluation (“2007
Findings”) (September 2007), at xxv, and foreign-born United
States citizens were seven times more likely to receive
erroneous tentative nonconfirmations than work-authorized
aliens, see id.  This study thus made clear that “further
improvements are needed” before E-Verify could be made
mandatory.  See id., at xxi.  Accordingly, through various
expansions of the program, Congress has continually required
that E-Verify be strictly voluntary for the vast majority of
employers.  See, e.g, Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-83, § 547, 123 Stat.
2177; Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-329, Div.
A, § 143, 122 Stat. 3574, 3580 (2008); Basic Pilot Program
Extension and Expansion Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-156, §§
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2, 3, 117 Stat. 1944 (2003); Basic Pilot Extension Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-128, § 2, 115 Stat. 2407 (2002).
The voluntariness of the system protects employers as
well as employees.  E-Verify has costs, including set-up and
training expenses.  See 2007 Findings, at xxvi; Edmondson, 594
F.3d at 756 (E-Verify has significant costs “in the form of
implementation and training expenses.”).  Given the problems
with the system, these costs are not yet a reliable investment.
Moreover, E-Verify continues to operate on a trial basis, and
absent action by Congress, its statutory authorization will
terminate in 2012.  See Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-83, § 547, 123 Stat.
2177.  Mandating E-Verify now therefore requires employers to
incur costs that may be entirely worthless in the long-run.  In all
these ways, Congress’s refusal to make E-Verify mandatory is
consistent with its objective of ensuring that IRCA imposes the
“minimum burden necessary . . . to be effective.”  See 132 Cong.
Rec. H10583-01 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Bryant).
Additionally, Hazleton’s scheme increases the burden on
interstate employers by failing to provide safe harbor for those
121
who use the I-9 process.  As the court explained in Edmondson,
“[b]y making the I-9 system a uniform national requirement,
Congress limited the compliance burden on interstate
corporations while facilitating uniform enforcement.”  594 F.3d
at 767.  A uniform system reduces costs for employers with
multiple locations throughout the country by ensuring that the
same human resources procedures can be used in all locations.
Hazleton’s scheme denies interstate employers who use the I-9
process the benefits of uniformity.  Interstate employers with
locations in Hazleton (who wish to ensure safe harbor in all
locations) would either have to adhere to different regulations in
different locations, or use E-Verify in all locations.  
In its defense, Hazleton argues that the other courts that
have considered the question of states’ and localities’ power to
mandate E-Verify have concluded that there is insufficient
evidence that Congress’s refusal to allow the federal
government to make E-Verify mandatory reflects an intent to
deprive states and localities of the power to do so.  In Chicanos
Por La Causa, for instance, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit concluded that an Arizona law that made use of E-Verify
mandatory was not conflict pre-empted.  It explained that the
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fact that “Congress made participation in E-Verify voluntary at
the national level . . . did not in and of itself indicate that
Congress intended to prevent states from making participation
mandatory.”  See Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 866-67.
Similarly, in Gray, the District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri declined to interpret “Congress’s decision not to make
[E-Verify] mandatory as restricting a state or local government’s
authority under the police powers.”  Gray, 2008 WL 294294, at
*19.  That court reasoned that a locality’s mandating of E-Verify
is consistent with the federal goal of “greater enforcement.”  Id.
These decisions, however, fail to afford proper weight to
the purposes underlying Congress’s decision to retain E-Verify
as a voluntary program.  Despite its advantages, E-Verify also
has significant problems, and accordingly mandating its use
interferes with the balancing of interests embodied in IRCA.
The conclusion that mandating E-Verify is consistent with the
goal of “greater enforcement” thus simply ignores that
enforcement is not Congress’s only concern.  Again, Hazleton
has placed a priority on deterring employment of unauthorized
aliens, but failed to concern itself with the costs its ordinance
imposes on employers and on work-authorized aliens.
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There is yet another way in which the IIRAO obstructs
the congressional purposes underlying IRCA.  The IIRAO
coerces employers to verify the work authorization of
independent contractors, even though Congress purposely
excluded independent contractors from IRCA’s verification
requirements.  Although employers do face liability under IRCA
for knowingly utilizing the services of independent contractors
who are unauthorized aliens, they are not required to actually
verify contractors’ work eligibility, as they must with
employees.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a).  Thus, employers can
utilize contractors’ services without incurring the expense of
verification, or the anxiety of potential sanctions.  The IIRAO,
on the other hand, does not distinguish between employees and
independent contractors, and thus effectively coerces businesses
to verify their contractors’ authorization.  See IIRAO § 4A.  In
so doing, the IIRAO fundamentally alters a business’s
relationship with its contractors and undermines the careful
balancing of objectives Congress intended.
In drafting IRCA, Congress explicitly declined to
sanction employers based on the work authorization status of
“casual hires (i.e., those that do not involve the existence of an
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employer/employee relationship).”  H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(I), at
11.  This was not an unreasoned choice, but part of the crafting
of the statute to minimize the burden placed on employers.  As
the court explained in Edmondson, “[e]mployers are not
required [under federal law] to verify the work eligibility of
independent contractors” because it “would increase the burdens
on business.”  594 F.3d at 767.  Businesses utilize independent
contractors, in part, to reduce the costs and liabilities associated
with procuring labor when an enduring and structured
relationship is not needed.  Compelling businesses to concern
themselves with the work authorization status of contractors
alters this relationship, and also raises costs. 
Ironically, the IIRAO is equally problematic for pre-
emption purposes because it only coerces but does not directly
require verification of independent contractors’ work
authorization, while imposing sanctions on employers if their
contractors are unauthorized.  Although earlier versions of the
bills that became IRCA did not require employers to use an
employment verification system, Congress ultimately decided
that a mandatory and uniformly used employment verification
system must be a counterpart of employer sanctions.  Absent that
 Plaintiffs also argue that the IIRAO stands as an obstacle36
to IRCA in several other ways.  They argue that it: requires
employers to verify the employment authorization of casual
domestic laborers, another group purposefully excluded from
IRCA’s verification requirements; requires unions to verify the
work authorization of members they refer for work in certain
instances, when unions operating in this capacity were also
purposefully excluded from IRCA’s verification requirements; and
denies to employees the “cure period” available under federal law
to establish work authorization after receiving a tentative
nonconfirmation from E-Verify.  Hazleton contests that the
IIRAO’s employment provisions operate in these ways, and the
language of the ordinance in ambiguous.  Furthermore, the district
court did not make any findings that would allow us to resolve
these claims.  Accordingly, we do not factor these considerations
into our pre-emption analysis.  As we have explained,
“hypothetical” conflicts usually will not support a finding of pre-
emption.  See Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 310.
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requirement, Congress concluded, employers would too often
“guess” about their prospective hires’ work authorization.  See
H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(I), at 23 (“[T]he bill does provide
substantial protections against discrimination in the form of a
uniform verification process for all new hires.”); S. Rep. No. 99-
132, at 23 (“To be nondiscriminatory . . . any employee
eligibility system must apply equally to each member of the U.S.
workforce.”).  Guesswork unavoidably yields discrimination in
hiring, and that result could not be more at odds with
congressional intent.  36
Hazleton’s failure to balance its sanctions with anti-
discrimination protections is a final area in which the
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employment provisions of the IIRAO significantly conflict with
IRCA.  Congress was clear that “a mechanism to remedy any
discrimination that [occurs because of employer sanctions] must
be a part of” employer sanctions legislation.  H.R. Rep. No. 99-
682(I), at 22.  Hazleton contends that IRCA’s anti-
discrimination provision fully accomplishes the congressional
goal of deterring unlawful discrimination, and that it is not
compelled to duplicate federal efforts.  Hazleton misses the
point.
While drafting IRCA, Congress heard testimony that
imposing employer sanctions would create economic incentives
for employers to discriminate against workers who appeared to
be of foreign origin.  If hiring unauthorized aliens were
penalized, but discriminating against authorized foreign workers
were not, employers might rationally choose not to hire anyone
who appeared “foreign” in an effort to avoid entirely the threat
of sanctions.  See, e.g., 132 Cong. Rec. S16879-01 (daily ed.
Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Hart) (“The employer
sanctions in the legislation will undoubtedly act as an incentive
for businesses to ‘play it safe’ and refuse to hire individuals
whose status may be in question.  This would mean that
127
[B]lacks, Hispanics, and Asians would encounter new
difficulties in getting hired.”).  Consequently, Congress decided
that IRCA must allow judges to impose on employers who
discriminate in hiring penalties of the exact same magnitude as
imposed on employers who hire unauthorized aliens.  Compare
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A)(i)-(iii) with 8 U.S.C. §
1324b(g)(2)(B)(iv)(I)-(III).  
The IIRAO’s employment provisions upset this careful
balance.  By imposing additional sanctions on employers who
hire unauthorized aliens, while not penalizing those who
discriminate, Hazleton has elected to place all of its weight on
one side of the regulatory scale.  This creates the exact situation
that Congress feared: a system under which employers might
quite rationally choose to err on the side of discriminating
against job applicants they perceive to be foreign.  This is
inconsistent with IRCA and therefore cannot be tolerated under
the Supremacy Clause.
Hazleton attempts to parry the thrust of this argument by
again relying on the decisions in Chicanos Por La Causa and
Gray.  Those courts rejected the argument that licensing laws
that revoked the licenses of businesses who employed
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unauthorized aliens were likely to increase discrimination, and
would contravene IRCA absent an anti-discrimination
component.
We believe those decisions undervalue the emphasis
Congress placed on preventing discrimination, and the pain-
staking care Congress took to achieve that objective.  For
example, the courts in both Chicanos Por La Causa and Gray
demanded proof that employer sanctions result in
discrimination.  That is puzzling because Congress has already
addressed that question.  Although Congress could not have
been certain that one-sided sanctions would lead to future
discrimination when it enacted IRCA, it was sufficiently
troubled by the likelihood to commit to preventative action.  See
H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(II), at 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5757 (The “House of Representatives recognized [the] potential
for this unfortunate cause and effect relationship between
sanctions enforcement and resulting employment
discrimination”).  Notably, Congress also required the
Comptroller General to report, three years after IRCA’s
enactment, on whether employer sanctions had resulted in
discrimination.  The Comptroller General concluded that
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employer sanctions had caused “widespread discrimination.”
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO/T-GGD-90-31,
Testimony on Immigration Reform: Employer Sanctions and the
Question of Discrimination (1990).  
Congress stated repeatedly that countervailing anti-
discrimination protections must be a part of any employer
sanctions legislation, see H.R. Rep. No. 99-682(II), at 4 (“[I]f
there is to be sanctions enforcement and liability, there must be
an equally strong and readily available remedy if resulting
employment discrimination occurs.”) (emphasis added), and we
think this just as  true when states and localities regulate in this
area.  To be consistent with federal law, states and localities that
use regulatory enactments to sanction employers who have been
found guilty of employing unauthorized aliens under IRCA must
impose sanctions of equal severity on employers found guilty of
discriminating.
Hazleton attempts to shield its legislative efforts from
pre-emption based on the doctrine of “concurrent enforcement,”
but this could not be less persuasive.  As Hazleton itself
acknowledges, “concurrent enforcement activity is authorized”
only where “state enforcement activities do not impair federal
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regulatory interests.”  Hazleton’s Br. 57 (quoting Gonzales v.
City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on
other grounds by, Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037
(9th Cir. 1999)) (emphasis added).  Hazleton claims that the
IIRAO satisfies this standard because “the employment
provisions . . . were drafted with meticulous care to match the
terminology and scope of federal law.”  Hazleton’s Br. 58.
Given our discussion thus far, we need not belabor here
explaining why this assertion is wrong.  Simply put, Hazleton
has enacted a regulatory scheme that is designed to further the
single objective of federal law that it deems important –
ensuring unauthorized aliens do not work in the United States.
It has chosen to disregard Congress’s other objectives –
protecting lawful immigrants and others from employment
discrimination, and minimizing the burden imposed on
employers.  Regulatory “cherry picking” is not concurrent
enforcement, and it is not constitutionally permitted.
Notably, this is not the first time that we have confronted
a local law that skews the federal government’s careful
balancing of objectives in the regulation of alien employment.
We addressed a similar situation over thirty years ago in Rogers
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v. Larson, 563 F.2d 617 (1977).  There, the Government of the
Virgin Islands had enacted a law which called for the
replacement of certain nonimmigrant alien workers with
qualified citizens or lawful permanent resident workers, if and
when such workers became available.  Nonimmigrant aliens
brought suit arguing that the territorial law was pre-empted by
the INA, and in particular by federal regulations guaranteeing
nonimmigrant aliens’ employment for definite periods of time.
We agreed.  
In striking down the Virgin Islands’ legislative effort as
an obstacle to the congressional purposes underlying the INA,
we made clear that the fact that the two statutory schemes shared
purposes in common did not save the territorial law from pre-
emption.  Rather, the laws were directly at odds with each other
because they “str[uck] the balance between [the] goals
differently.”  Id. at 626.  The Virgin Islands statute struck the
balance “more in the direction of protection of citizen-workers,”
and federal law struck it more in the direction of protection of
employers and alien workers.  Id.  “Because of the different
emphasis the two statutory schemes place[d] on the purposes of
job protection and an adequate labor force,” the Virgin Islands
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provision was invalid under the Supremacy Clause.  Id.  The
same is just as true here.
It is, of course, not our job to sit in judgment of whether
state and local frustration about federal immigration policy is
warranted.  We are, however, required to intervene when states
and localities directly undermine the federal objectives
embodied in statutes enacted by Congress.  The employment
provisions of the IIRAO “stand[] as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution” of IRCA’s objectives, Hines,
312 U.S. at 67, and thus are pre-empted.
2.  Housing Provisions
Our final inquiry addresses Plaintiffs’ claim that the
housing provisions of the IIRAO and the RO are pre-empted.
The district court agreed with Plaintiffs, and so do we.
Before delving into the substance of this analysis,
however, we must first consider whether the presumption
against pre-emption applies to the housing provisions.  The
district court did not distinguish between the employment and
housing provisions in addressing the presumption; it summarily
concluded that both operate in the field of “immigration,” and
that because of the “history of significant federal presence” in
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that area, the presumption did not apply.  Lozano, 496 F. Supp.
2d at 518 n.41.  We have explained why that conclusion was
erroneous as applied to the employment provisions, which under
DeCanas, fall within the states’ historic police powers.  The
housing provisions, however, raise a very different issue.  As the
District Court for the Northern District of Texas explained in
Farmers Branch III, “[l]ocal regulation that conditions the
ability to enter private contract for shelter on federal
immigration status is of a fundamentally different nature than .
. . restrictions on employment.”  ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2010 WL
1141398, at *16.
The parties characterize the housing provisions of the RO
and the IIRAO in starkly different terms.  Hazleton maintains
that the housing provisions regulate rental accommodations, and
thus, like the employment provisions, fall within the state’s
historic police powers.  Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that
these provisions regulate who may live in Hazleton based on
immigration status, and that regulating which aliens are
permitted to reside in the United States is a historically federal
function far beyond the police powers of any state.  
Although we realize that a state certainly can, and
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presumably should, regulate rental accommodations to ensure
the health and safety of its residents, and that such regulation
may permissibly affect the rights of persons in the country
unlawfully, see DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355, we cannot bury our
heads in the sand ostrich-like ignoring the reality of what these
ordinances accomplish.  Through its housing provisions,
Hazleton attempts to regulate residence based solely on
immigration status.  Deciding which aliens may live in the
United States has always been the prerogative of the federal
government.  Hazleton purposefully chose to enter this area of
“significant federal presence.”  Locke, 529 U.S. at 108.
Accordingly, we will not presume nonpre-emption.
The rest of our analysis flows directly from our
conclusion that Hazleton’s housing provisions regulate which
aliens may live there.  Under DeCanas, a state or locality may
not “regulate immigration,” which the Supreme Court has
defined as any attempt to determine “who should or should not
be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a
legal entrant may remain.”  DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355.  Such
power is delegated by the Constitution exclusively to the federal
government, and even if Congress had never acted in the field,
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states and localities would be precluded from doing so.  See id.
Thus, over a century ago, the Supreme Court explained that:
“[t]he doctrine is firmly established that the power to exclude or
expel aliens is vested in the political departments of the [federal]
government, to be regulated by treaty or by act of Congress.”
Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296, 302 (1902).  Whether
Hazleton inadvertently stumbled into this exclusively federal
domain, or decided to defiantly barge in, it is clear that it has
attempted to usurp authority that the Constitution has placed
beyond the vicissitudes of local governments.
The housing provisions of the IIRAO and the RO are also
field pre-empted by the INA.  As the Supreme Court explained
in DeCanas, the central concern of the INA is with “the terms
and conditions of admission to the country and the subsequent
treatment of aliens lawfully in the country.”  424 U.S. at 359.
The “comprehensiveness of the INA scheme for regulation of
immigration and naturalization,” id., plainly precludes state
efforts, whether harmonious or conflicting, to regulate residence
in this country based on immigration status. 
We recognize, of course, that Hazleton’s housing
provisions neither control actual physical entry into the City, nor
 We point out that they could stay with friends only if37
those friends owned property and did not rent.  Authorized
occupants of apartments who permit persons lacking lawful
immigration status to stay with them are also fined under the RO:
“$1000 for each . . . Occupant . . . that does not have an occupancy
permit” and $100 per day per any such Occupant until the violation
is corrected.  RO § 10b.
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physically expel persons from it.  Nonetheless, “[i]n essence,”
that is precisely what they attempt to do.  Bonito Boats, 489 U.S.
at 160.  “It is difficult to conceive of a more effective method”
of ensuring that persons do not enter or remain in a locality than
by precluding their ability to live in it.  Id.  
At oral argument, Hazleton posited that aliens lacking
lawful status could still reside in the City through purchasing a
home, or through staying with friends.   The response is as37
disingenuous as it is unrealistic.  There is nothing on this record
that suggests that the people whom the residential provisions are
aimed at could avail themselves of such options.  Even if they
were viable alternatives for some, however, many others still
would be excluded, and that is sufficient for these provisions to
be pre-empted. 
We also recognize that Hazleton’s housing provisions
regulate presence only within its city limits, not the entire
country.  This does not change the analysis.  To be meaningful,
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the federal government’s exclusive control over residence in this
country must extend to any political subdivision.  Again, it is not
only Hazleton’s ordinance that we must consider.  If Hazleton
can regulate as it has here, then so could every other state or
locality.  See Rowe, 552 U.S. at 373.  As the District Court for
the Northern District of Texas reasoned: “we can imagine the
slippery slope . . . if every local and state government enacted
laws purporting to determine that . . . [certain persons] could not
stay in their bounds.  If every city and state enacted and enforced
such laws . . . the federal government’s control over decisions
relating to immigration would be effectively eviscerated.”
Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch
(“Farmers Branch I”), No. 3:08-cv-1551-B, Hrg. Tr. at 136
(N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2008).  Indeed, the record strongly suggests
that Hazleton’s mayor intended these provisions to be at the
forefront of exactly such an evisceration.  See supra note 31.
The housing provisions of the IIRAO and the RO are also
conflict pre-empted by the INA.  As the district court explained,
these provisions attempt to effectively “remove” persons from
Hazleton based on a snapshot of their current immigration
status, rather than based on a federal order of removal.  This is
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fundamentally inconsistent with the INA.
Hazleton goes to great lengths to defend its housing
provisions as providing for an accurate assessment of tenants’
immigration status, and only denying housing to those whom the
federal government confirms are here unlawfully.  Even
assuming Hazleton is correct, this argument does not advance
Hazleton’s cause; rather, it highlights the fundamental
misconception at the heart of these ordinances.  Through its
housing provisions, Hazleton attempts to remove persons from
the community based on current immigration status.  However,
as Justice Blackmun explained in Plyler: “the structure of the
immigration statutes makes it impossible for the State to
determine which aliens are entitled to residence, and which
eventually will be deported.”  457 U.S. at 236 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
Under federal law, an unlawful immigration status does
not lead instantly, or inevitably, to removal.  Under most
circumstances, a federal removal hearing under section 240 of
the INA is required.  Absent certain limited exceptions, this
proceeding is the “sole and exclusive procedure for determining
whether an alien may be admitted to the United States or, if the
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alien has been so admitted, removed from the United States.”
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3).  As we explained in detail above,
knowing whether the government will decide to initiate
proceedings against a particular alien is as impossible as trying
to predict the outcome of such a proceeding once initiated.
The federal government has discretion in deciding
whether and when to initiate removal proceedings.  See Juarez,
599 F.3d at 566.  As the district court found, the government
purposefully exercises its discretion not to prosecute in certain
instances, and thereby tacitly allows the presence of those whose
technical status remains “illegal.”  See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d
at 531 n.56.  Furthermore, once the government initiates these
proceedings, whether they will result in removal is far from
certain.  A judge may award discretionary relief saving a
removable alien from removal, or even adjusting that alien’s
status to that of lawful permanent resident.  See 8 U.S.C. §
1229b.  Thus, for these reasons, it is simply:
impossible for a State to determine which aliens
the Federal Government will eventually deport,
which the Federal Government will permit to stay,
and which the Federal Government will ultimately
naturalize.  Until an undocumented alien is
ordered deported by the Federal Government, no
State can be assured that the alien will not be
 See Julia Preston, Students Spared Amid an Increase in38
Deportations, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 2010.
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found to have a federal permission to reside in the
country, perhaps even as a citizen.  Indeed, even
the Immigration and Naturalization Service
cannot predict with certainty whether any
individual alien has a right to reside in the country
until deportation proceedings have run their
course.  
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 241 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring). 
Stitched into the fabric of Hazleton’s housing provisions,
then, is either a lack of understanding or a refusal to recognize
the complexities of federal immigration law.  Hazleton would
effectively remove from its City an alien college student the
federal government has purposefully declined to initiate removal
proceedings against.   So too would Hazleton remove an alien38
battered spouse, currently unlawfully present, but eligible for
adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident under the
special protections Congress has afforded to battered spouses
and children.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2).  In each of these
instances, as in every single instance in which Hazleton would
deny residence to an alien based on immigration status rather
than on a federal order of removal, Hazleton would act directly
in opposition to federal law.
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Hazleton attempts to avoid this result by again relying on
the concept of “concurrent enforcement” to defend its housing
provisions.  According to Hazleton, its housing provisions
mirror the INA’s prohibition against “harboring,” which
imposes criminal penalties on:
Any person who . . . knowing or in reckless
disregard of the fact that an alien has come to,
entered, or remains in the United States in
violation of law, conceals, harbors, or shields
from detection, or attempts to conceal, harbor, or
shield from detection, such alien in any place,
including any building or any means of
transportation. 
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii).  Hazleton contends that since
federal courts have consistently found that providing housing to
aliens lacking lawful immigration status constitutes unlawful
“harboring,” its housing provisions do no more than
concurrently enforce federal law.  Hazleton is wrong. 
As we have explained, Hazleton’s housing provisions
operate in a field which the federal government exclusively
occupies.  Therefore, even if Hazleton’s housing provisions did
concurrently enforce federal law, this would not save them; even
harmonious regulation is pre-empted here.  However, Hazleton
is also plainly incorrect in claiming that its housing provisions
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“mirror” federal law.  The federal prohibition against harboring
has never been interpreted to apply so broadly as to encompass
the typical landlord/tenant relationship.  
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) criminalizes harboring an
alien, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that the alien
came to, or remains in, the United States in violation of law.
The statute, however, does not define the term “harboring,” and
the Supreme Court has yet to do so.  As a result, the breadth of
the term is currently in dispute among the Circuit Courts of
Appeals.  Some courts, our own included, have found that
culpability requires some conduct that helps to conceal an alien
from authorities.  We, along with the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, define “harboring” as conduct “tending to
substantially facilitate an alien’s remaining in the United States
illegally and to prevent government authorities from detecting
the alien’s unlawful presence.”  United States v. Ozcelik, 527
F.3d 88, 100 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(emphasis added); see also United States v. Kim, 193 F.3d 567,
574 (2d Cir. 1999) (Harboring “encompasses conduct tending
substantially to facilitate an alien’s remaining in the United
States illegally and to prevent government authorities from
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detecting his unlawful presence.”) (emphasis added).  Thus, we
have held that “harboring” requires some act of obstruction that
reduces the likelihood the government will discover the alien’s
presence.  It is highly unlikely that a landlord’s renting of an
apartment to an alien lacking lawful immigration status could
ever, without more, satisfy this definition of harboring.  Renting
an apartment in the normal course of business is not in and of
itself conduct that prevents the government from detecting an
alien’s presence. 
It is true that other Courts of Appeals have held that a
showing of concealment is unnecessary, and that conduct which
merely “substantially facilitates an alien’s remaining in the
country illegally” is sufficient to constitute harboring.  See, e.g.,
United States v. Tipton, 518 F.3d 591, 595 (8th Cir. 2008)
(internal alteration omitted).  However, even under the more
lenient tests of these jurisdictions, we are not aware of any case
in which someone has been convicted of “harboring” merely
because s/he rented an apartment to someone s/he knew (or had
reason to know) was not legally in the United States.
 Notably, all the cases cited by Hazleton for that
proposition involve defendants who played a much more active
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role in helping an alien remain in the United States.  See, e.g.,
Tipton, 518 F.3d at 595 (defendant employer who employed and
housed six unauthorized alien employees, provided them with
transportation and money to purchase necessities, and
maintained counterfeit immigration papers for them guilty of
harboring); United States v. Zheng, 306 F.3d 1080, 1082 (11th
Cir. 2002) (defendant employer who permitted ten to twenty
unauthorized alien employees, who were overworked and
underpaid, to live at his house in “barrack-like
accommodations” without paying rent guilty of harboring); Kim,
193 F.3d at 574-75 (defendant employer who advised
unauthorized alien employees to change names and acquire false
documentation guilty of harboring); United States v. Sanchez,
963 F.2d 152, 155 (8th Cir. 1992) (defendant employer who
paid to rent an apartment for unauthorized alien employees,
provided them with transportation to and from work, and offered
to obtain immigration papers for them guilty of harboring).
None of these cases involve anything verging on a simple
landlord/tenant relationship.  Rather, the fact that so many of
these cases involve employers emphasizes that something much
more is needed to turn renting a residential unit into harboring.
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Furthermore, regardless of the breadth of the term
“harboring” in and of itself, there is no question that harboring
is illegal under federal law only if a defendant knew or was in
reckless disregard of the harbored alien’s immigration status.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a).  Hazleton argues that the housing
provisions of the IIRAO similarly only prohibit renting to
persons known to lack lawful immigration status.  This isolated
reading of the IIRAO is misleading.  Taken together, the IIRAO
and the RO not only prohibit the knowing harboring of (defined
to include the rental of housing to) certain aliens, but also make
legal immigration status a qualification for occupancy of rental
housing.  Although the typical landlord might never know of
her/his tenant’s immigration status, Hazleton’s provisions
collectively require that any provider of rental housing be put on
notice about the immigration status of potential renters.  See
Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 493 (Espinal testified that “he
understood the ordinances to require that he obtain information
on immigration status from tenants that he normally would not
seek.”). 
Although the federal government does not intend for
aliens here unlawfully to be harbored, it has never evidenced an
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intent for them to go homeless.  Cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(F)(i)
(explaining that an alien noticed to appear for a removal
proceeding must immediately provide the Attorney General
“with a written record of an address . . . at which the alien may
be contacted respecting [the] proceeding.”).  Common sense, of
course, suggests that Hazleton has absolutely no interest in
reducing aliens without legal status to homelessness either.  No
municipality would benefit from forcing any group of residents
(“legal” or “illegal”) onto its streets.  Rather, it appears plain
that the purpose of these housing provisions is to ensure that
aliens lacking legal immigration status reside somewhere other
than Hazleton.  It is this power to effectively prohibit residency
based on immigration status that is so clearly within the
exclusive domain of the federal government. 
In sum, we find the housing provisions of Hazleton’s
ordinances pre-empted regulations of immigration, and both
field and conflict pre-empted by the INA.
VII.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm in part and
reverse in part the district court’s order permanently enjoining
Hazleton’s enforcement of the IIRAO and the RO.
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VIII.  APPENDIX
A.  The Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance
(Ordinance 2006-18, as amended by Ordinances 2006-40 and
2007-7)
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION RELIEF ACT ORDINANCE
BE IT ORDAINED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF
HAZLETON AS FOLLOWS:
SECTION 1. TITLE
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the “City of
Hazleton Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance.”
SECTION 2. FINDINGS AND DECLARATION OF
PURPOSE
The People of the City of Hazleton find and declare:
A. That state and federal law require that certain conditions be
met before a person may be authorized to work or reside in this
country.
B. That unlawful workers and illegal aliens, as defined by this
ordinance and state and federal law, do not normally meet such
conditions as a matter of law when present in the City of
Hazleton.
C. That unlawful employment, the harboring of illegal aliens in
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dwelling units in the City of Hazleton, and crime committed by
illegal aliens harm the health, safety and welfare of authorized
US workers and legal residents in the City of Hazleton. Illegal
immigration leads to higher crime rates, subjects our hospitals
to fiscal hardship and legal residents to substandard quality of
care, contributes to other burdens on public services, increasing
their cost and diminishing their availability to legal residents,
and diminishes our overall quality of life.
D. That the City of Hazleton is authorized to abate public
nuisances and empowered and mandated by the people of
Hazleton to abate the nuisance of illegal immigration by
diligently prohibiting the acts and policies that facilitate illegal
immigration in a manner consistent with federal law and the
objectives of Congress.
E. That United States Code Title 8, subsection 1324(a)(1)(A)
prohibits the harboring of illegal aliens. The provision of
housing to illegal aliens is a fundamental component of
harboring.
F. This ordinance seeks to secure to those lawfully present in the
United States and this City, whether or not they are citizens of
the United States, the right to live in peace free of the threat
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crime, to enjoy the public services provided by this city without
being burdened by the cost of providing goods, support and
services to aliens unlawfully present in the United States, and to
be free of the debilitating effects on their economic and social
well being imposed by the influx of illegal aliens to the fullest
extent that these goals can be achieved consistent with the
Constitution and Laws of the United States and the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
G. The City shall not construe this ordinance to prohibit the
rendering of emergency medical care, emergency assistance, or
legal assistance toany person.
SECTION 3. DEFINITIONS
When used in this chapter, the following words, terms and
phrases shall have the meanings ascribed to them herein, and
shall be construed so as to be consistent with state and federal
law, including federal immigration law:
A. “Business entity” means any person or group of persons
performing or engaging in any activity, enterprise, profession,
or occupation for gain, benefit, advantage, or livelihood,
whether for profit or not for profit.
(1) The term business entity shall include but not be limited to
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selfemployed individuals, partnerships, corporations,
contractors, and subcontractors.
(2) The term business entity shall include any business entity
that possesses a business permit, any business entity that is
exempt by law from obtaining such a business permit, and any
business entity that is operating unlawfully without such a
business permit.
B. “City” means the City of Hazleton.
C. “Contractor” means a person, employer, subcontractor or
business entity that enters into an agreement to perform any
service or work or to provide a certain product in exchange for
valuable consideration. This definition shall include but not be
limited to a subcontractor, contract employee, or a recruiting or
staffing entity.
D. “Illegal Alien” means an alien who is not lawfully present in
the United States, according to the terms of United States Code
Title 8, section 1101 et seq. The City shall not conclude that a
person is an illegal alien unless and until an authorized
representative of the City has verified with the federal
government, pursuant to United States Code Title 8, subsection
1373(c), that the person is an alien who is not lawfully present
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in the United States.
E. “Unlawful worker” means a person who does not have the
legal right or authorization to work due to an impediment in any
provision of federal, state or local law, including but not limited
to a minor disqualified by nonage, or an unauthorized alien as
defined by United States Code Title 8, subsection 1324a(h)(3).
F. “Work” means any job, task, employment, labor, personal
services, or any other activity for which compensation is
provided, expected, or due, including but not limited to all
activities conducted by business entities.
G. “Basic Pilot Program” means the electronic verification of
work authorization program of the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, P.L. 104-208,
Division C, Section 403(a); United States Code Title 8,
subsection 1324a, and operated by the United States Department
of Homeland Security (or a successor program established by
the federal government.)
SECTION 4. BUSINESS PERMITS, CONTRACTS, OR
GRANTS  
A. It is unlawful for any business entity to knowingly recruit,
hire for employment, or continue to employ, or to permit,
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dispatch, or instruct any person who is an unlawful worker to
perform work in whole or part within the City. Every business
entity that applies for a business permit to engage in any type of
work in the City shall sign an affidavit, prepared by the City
Solicitor, affirming that they do not knowingly utilize the
services or hire any person who is an unlawful worker.
B. Enforcement: The Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall
enforce the requirements of this section.
(1) An enforcement action shall be initiated by means of a
written signed complaint to the Hazleton Code Enforcement
Office submitted by any City official, business entity, or City
resident. A valid complaint shall include an allegation which
describes the alleged violator(s) as well as the actions
constituting the violation, and the date and location where such
actions occurred.
(2) A complaint which alleges a violation on the basis of
national origin, ethnicity, or race shall be deemed invalid and
shall not be enforced.
(3) Upon receipt of a valid complaint, the Hazleton Code
Enforcement Office shall, within three business days, request
identity information from the business entity regarding any
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persons alleged to be unlawful workers. The Hazleton Code
Enforcement Office shall suspend the business permit of any
business entity which fails, within three business days after
receipt of the request, to provide such information. In instances
where an unlawful worker is alleged to be an unauthorized
alien, as defined in United States Code Title 8, subsection
1324a(h)(3), the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall
submit identity data required by the federal government to
verify, pursuant to United States Code Title 8, section 1373, the
immigration status of such person(s), and shall provide the
business entity with written confirmation of that verification.
(4) The Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall suspend the
business permit of any business entity which fails correct a
violation of this section within three business days after
notification of the violation by the Hazleton Code Enforcement
Office.
(5) The Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall not suspend
the business permit of a business entity if, prior to the date of the
violation, the business entity had verified the work
authorization of the alleged unlawful worker(s) using the Basic
Pilot Program.
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(6) The suspension shall terminate one business day after a legal
representative of the business entity submits, at a City office
designated by the City Solicitor, a sworn affidavit stating that
the violation has ended.
(a) The affidavit shall include a description of the specific
measures and actions taken by the business entity to end
the violation, and shall include the name, address and
other adequate identifying information of the unlawful
workers related to the complaint.
(b) Where two or more of the unlawful workers were
verified by the federal government to be unauthorized
aliens, the legal representative of the business entity shall
submit to the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office, in
addition to the prescribed affidavit, documentation
acceptable to the City Solicitor which confirms that the
business entity has enrolled in and will participate in the
Basic Pilot Program for the duration of the validity of the
business permit granted to the business entity.
(7) For a second or subsequent violation, the Hazleton Code
Enforcement Office shall suspend the business permit of a
business entity for a period of twenty days. After the end of the
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suspension period, and upon receipt of the prescribed affidavit,
the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall reinstate the
business permit. The Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall
forward the affidavit, complaint, and associated documents to
the appropriate federal enforcement agency, pursuant to United
States Code Title 8, section 1373. In the case of an unlawful
worker disqualified by state law not related to immigration, the
Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall forward the affidavit,
complaint, and associated documents to the appropriate state
enforcement agency.
C. All agencies of the City shall enroll and participate in the
Basic Pilot Program.
D. As a condition for the award of any City contract or grant to
a business entity for which the value of employment, labor or,
personal services shall exceed $10,000, the business entity shall
provide documentation confirming its enrollment and
participation in the Basic Pilot Program.
E. Private Cause of Action for Unfairly Discharged Employees
(1) The discharge of any employee who is not an unlawful
worker by a business entity in the City is an unfair business
practice if, on the date of the discharge, the business entity was
156
not participating in the Basic Pilot program and the business
entity was employing an unlawful worker.
(2) The discharged worker shall have a private cause of action
in the Municipal Court of Hazleton against the business entity
for the unfair business practice. The business entity found to
have violated this subsection shall be liable to the aggrieved
employee for: (a) three times the actual damages sustained by
the employee, including but not limited to lost wages or
compensation from the date of the discharge until the
date the employee has procured new employment at an
equivalent rate of compensation, up to a period of one
hundred and twenty days; and (b) reasonable attorney’s fees and
costs.
SECTION 5. HARBORING ILLEGAL ALIENS
A. It is unlawful for any person or business entity that owns a
dwelling unit in the City to harbor an illegal alien in the
dwelling unit, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that
an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in
violation of law, unless such harboring is otherwise expressly
permitted by federal law.
(1) For the purposes of this section, to let, lease, or rent a
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dwelling unit to an illegal alien, knowing or in reckless
disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or
remains in the United States in violation of law, shall be deemed
to constitute harboring. To suffer or permit the occupancy of the
dwelling unit by an illegal alien, knowing or in reckless
disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or
remains in the United States in violation of law, shall also be
deemed to constitute harboring.
(2) A separate violation shall be deemed to have been committed
on each day that such harboring occurs, and for each adult
illegal alien harbored in the dwelling unit, beginning one
business day after receipt of a notice of violation from the
Hazleton Code Enforcement Office.
(3) A separate violation of this section shall be deemed to have
been committed for each business day on which the owner fails
to provide the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office with identity
data needed to obtain a federal verification of immigration
status, beginning three days after the owner receives written
notice from the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office.
B. Enforcement: The Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall
enforce the requirements of this section.
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(1) An enforcement action shall be initiated by means of a
written signed complaint to the Hazleton Code Enforcement
Office submitted by any official, business entity, or resident of
the City. A valid complaint shall include an allegation which
describes the alleged violator(s) as well as the actions
constituting the violation, and the date and location where such
actions occurred.
(2) A complaint which alleges a violation on the basis of
national origin, ethnicity, or race shall be deemed invalid and
shall not be enforced.
(3) Upon receipt of a valid written complaint, the Hazleton Code
Enforcement Office shall, pursuant to United States Code Title
8, section 1373(c), verify with the federal government the
immigration status of a person seeking to use, occupy, lease, or
rent a dwelling unit in the City. The Hazleton Code
Enforcement Office shall submit identity data required by the
federal government to verify immigration status. The City shall
forward identity data provided by the owner to the federal
government, and shall provide the property owner with written
confirmation of that verification.
(4) If after five business days following receipt of written notice
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from the City that a violation has occurred and that the
immigration status of any alleged illegal alien has been verified,
pursuant to United States Code Title 8, section 1373(c), the
owner of the dwelling unit fails to correct a violation of this
section, the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall deny or
suspend the rental license of the dwelling unit.
(5) For the period of suspension, the owner of the dwelling unit
shall not be permitted to collect any rent, payment, fee, or any
other form of compensation from, or on behalf of, any tenant or
occupant in the dwelling unit.
(6) The denial or suspension shall terminate one business day
after a legal representative of the dwelling unit owner submits
to the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office a sworn affidavit
stating that each and every violation has ended. The affidavit
shall include a description of the specific measures and actions
taken by the business entity to end the violation, and shall
include the name, address and other adequate identifying
information for the illegal aliens who were the subject of the
complaint.
(7) The Hazleton Code Enforcement Office shall forward the
affidavit, complaint, and associated documents to the
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appropriate federal enforcement agency, pursuant to United
States Code Title 8, section 1373.
(8) Any dwelling unit owner who commits a second or
subsequent violation of this section shall be subject to a fine of
two hundred and fifty dollars ($250) for each separate violation.
The suspension provisions of this section applicable to a first
violation shall also apply.
(9) Upon the request of a dwelling unit owner, the Hazleton
Code Enforcement Office shall, pursuant to United States Code
Title 8, section 1373(c), verify with the federal government the
lawful immigration status of a person seeking to use, occupy,
lease, or rent a dwelling unit in the City. The penalties in this
section shall not apply in the case of dwelling unit occupants
whose status as an alien lawfully present in the United States
has been verified.
SECTION 6. CONSTRUCTION AND SEVERABILITY
A. The requirements and obligations of this section shall be
implemented in a manner fully consistent with federal law
regulating immigration and protecting the civil rights of all
citizens and aliens.
B. If any part of provision of this Chapter is in conflict or
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inconsistent with applicable provisions of federal or state
statutes, or is otherwise held to be invalid or unenforceable by
any court of competent jurisdiction, such part of provision shall
be suspended and superseded by such applicable laws or
regulations, and the remainder of this Chapter shall not be
affected thereby.
SECTION 7. IMPLEMENTATION AND PROCESS
A. Prospective Application Only. The default presumption with
respect to Ordinances of the City of Hazleton—that such
Ordinances shall apply only prospectively—shall pertain to the
Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance. The Illegal
Immigration Relief Act Ordinance shall be applied only to
employment contracts, agreements to perform service or work,
and agreements to provide a certain product in exchange for
valuable consideration that are entered into or are renewed after
the date that the Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance
becomes effective and any judicial injunction prohibiting its
implementation is removed. The Illegal Immigration Relief Act
Ordinance shall be applied only to contracts to let, lease, or rent
dwelling units that are entered into or are renewed after the date
that the Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance becomes
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effective and any judicial injunction prohibiting its
implementation is removed.
The renewal of a month-to-month lease or other type of tenancy
which automatically renews absent notice by either party will
not be considered as entering into a new contract to let, lease or
rent a dwelling unit.
B. Condition of Lease. Consistent with the obligations of a
rental unit owner described in Section 5.A., a tenant may not
enter into a contract for the rental or leasing of a dwelling unit
unless the tenant is either a U.S. citizen or an alien lawfully
present in the United States according to the terms of United
States Code Title 8, Section 1101 et seq. A tenant who is neither
a U.S. citizen nor an alien lawfully present in the United States
who enters into such a contract shall be deemed to have
breached a condition of the lease under 68 P.S. Section 250.501.
A tenant who is not a U.S. citizen who subsequent to the
beginning of his tenancy becomes unlawfully present in the
United States shall be deemed to have breached a condition of
the lease under 68 P.S. Section 250.501.
C. Corrections of Violations—Employment of Unlawful
Workers. The correction of a violation with respect to the
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employment of an unlawful worker shall include any of the
following actions:
(1) The business entity terminates the unlawful worker’s
employment.
(2) The business entity, after acquiring additional information
from the worker, requests a secondary or additional verification
by the federal government of the worker’s authorization,
pursuant to the procedures of the Basic Pilot Program. While
this verification is pending, the three business day period
described in Section 4.B.(4) shall be tolled.
(3) The business entity attempts to terminate the unlawful
worker’s employment and such termination is challenged in a
court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. While the business
entity pursues the termination of the unlawful worker’s
employment in such forum, the three business day period
described in Section 4.B.(4) shall be tolled.
D. Corrections of Violations—Harboring Illegal Aliens. The
correction of a violation with respect to the harboring of an
illegal alien in a dwelling unit shall include any of the following
actions:
(1) A notice to quit, in writing, issued and served by the
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dwelling unit owner, as landlord, to the tenant declaring a
forfeiture of the lease for breach of the lease condition describe
in Section 7.B.
(2) The dwelling unit owner, after acquiring additional
information from the alien, requests the City of Hazleton to
obtain a secondary or additional verification by the federal
government that the alien is lawfully present in the United
States, under the procedures designated by the federal
government, pursuant to United States Code Title 8, Subsection
1373(c). While this second verification is pending, the five
business day period described in Section 5.B.(4) shall be tolled.
(3) The commencement of an action for the recovery of
possession of real property in accordance with Pennsylvania law
by the landlord against the illegal alien. If such action is
contested by the tenant in court, the dwelling unit owner shall be
deemed to have complied with this Ordinance while the
dwelling unit owner is pursuing the action in court. While this
process is pending, the five business day period described in
Section 5.B.(4) shall be tolled.
E. Procedure if Verification is Delayed. If the federal
government notifies the City of Hazleton that it is unable to
165
verify whether a tenant is lawfully present in the United States
or whether an employee is authorized to work in the United
States, the City of Hazleton shall take no further action on the
complaint until a verification from the federal government
concerning the status of the individual is received. At no point
shall any City official attempt to make an independent
determination of any alien’s legal status, without verification
from the federal government, pursuant to United States Code
Title 8, Subsection 1373(c).
F. Venue for Judicial Process. Any business entity or rental unit
owner subject to a complaint and subsequent enforcement under
this ordinance, or any employee of such a business entity or
tenant of such a rental unit owner, may challenge the
enforcement of this Ordinance with respect to such entity or
individual in the Magisterial District Court for the City of
Hazleton, subject to the right of appeal to the Luzerne County
Court of Common Pleas. Such an entity or individual may
alternatively challenge the enforcement of this Ordinance with
respect to such entity or individual in any other court of
competent jurisdiction in accordance with applicable law,
subject to all rights of appeal.
166
G. Deference to Federal Determinations of Status. The
determination of whether a tenant of a dwelling is lawfully
present in the United States, and the determination of whether
a worker is an unauthorized alien shall be made by the federal
government, pursuant to United States Code Title 8, Subsection
1373(c). A determination of such status of an individual by the
federal government shall create a rebuttable presumption as to
that individual’s status in any judicial proceedings brought
pursuant to this ordinance. The Court may take judicial
notice of any verification of the individual previously provided
by the federal government and may request the federal
government to provide automated or testimonial verification
pursuant to United States Code Title 8, Subsection 1373(c).
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B.  Rental Registration Ordinance
(Ordinance 2006-13)
ESTABLISHING A REGISTRATION PROGRAM FOR
RESIDENTIAL RENTAL PROPERTIES; REQUIRING ALL
OWNERS OF RESIDENTIAL RENTAL PROPERTIES TO
DESIGNATE AN AGENT FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS;
AND PRESCRIBING DUTIES OF OWNERS, AGENTS AND
OCCUPANTS; DIRECTING THE DESIGNATION OF
AGENTS; ESTABLISHING FEES FOR THE COSTS
ASSOCIATED WITH THE REGISTRATION OF RENTAL
PROPERTY; AND PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATIONS BE IT ORDAINED BY THE GOVERNING
BODY OF THE CITY OF HAZLETON AND IT IS HEREBY
ORDAINED AND WITH THE AUTHORITY OF THE SAME
AS FOLLOWS:
SECTION 1. DEFINITIONS AND INTERPRETATION.
The following words, when used in this ordinance, shall have
the meanings ascribed to them in this section, except in those
instances where the context clearly indicates otherwise. When
not inconsistent with the context, words used in the present tense
include the future; words in the plural number include the
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singular number; words in the singular shall include the plural,
and words in the masculine shall include the feminine and the
neuter. 
a. AGENT - Individual of legal majority who has been
designated by the Owner as the agent of the Owner or manager
of the Property under the provisions of this ordinance.
b. CITY - City of Hazleton
c. CITY CODE – the building code (property Maintenance Code
1996 as amendedor superceded) officially adopted by the
governing body of the City, or other such codes officially
designated by the governing body of the City for the regulation
of construction, alteration, addition, repair, removal, demolition,
location, occupancy and maintenance of buildings and
structures.
d. ZONING ORDINANCE – Zoning ordinance as officially
adopted by the City of Hazleton, File of Council # 95-26 (as
amended).
e. OFFICE – The Office of Code Enforcement for the City of
Hazleton.
f. DWELLING UNIT – a single habitable unit, providing living
facilities for one or more persons, including permanent space for
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living, sleeping, eating, cooking and bathing and sanitation,
whether furnished or unfurnished. There may be more than one
Dwelling Unit on a Premises.
g. DORMITORY - a residence hall offered as student or faculty
housing to accommodate a college or university, providing
living or sleeping rooms for individuals or groups of individuals,
with or without cooking facilities and with or without private
baths.
h. INSPECTOR - any person authorized by Law or Ordinance
to inspect buildings or systems, e.g. zoning, housing, plumbing,
electrical systems, heat systems, mechanical systems and health
necessary to operate or use buildings within the City of
Hazleton. An Inspector would include those identified in
Section 8 – Enforcement.
i. FIRE DEPARTMENT – the Fire Department of the City of
Hazleton or any member thereof, and includes the Chief of Fire
or his designee.
j. HOTEL – a building or part of a building in which living and
sleeping accommodations are used primarily for transient
occupancy, may be rented on a daily basis, and desk service is
provided, in addition to one or more of the following services:
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maid, telephone, bellhop service, or the furnishing or laundering
of linens.
k. LET FOR OCCUPANCY – to permit, provide or offer, for
consideration, possession or occupancy of a building, dwelling
unit, rooming unit, premise or structure by a person who is not
the legal owner of record thereof, pursuant to a written or
unwritten lease, agreement or license, or pursuant to a recorded
or unrecorded agreement or contract for the sale of land.
l. MOTEL – a building or group of buildings which contain
living and sleeping accommodations used primarily for transient
occupancy, may be rented on a daily basis, and desk service is
provided, and has individual entrances from outside the building
to serve each such living or sleeping unit.
m. OCCUPANT – a person age 18 or older who resides at a
Premises.
n. OPERATOR – any person who has charge, care or control of
a Premises which is offered or let for occupancy.
o. OWNER – any Person, Agent, or Operator having a legal or
equitable interest in the property; or recorded in the official
records of the state, county, or municipality as holding title to
the property; or otherwise having control of the property,
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including the guardian of the estate of any such person, and the
executor or administrator of the estate of such person if ordered
to take possession of real property by a Court of competent
jurisdiction.
p. OWNER – OCCUPANT- an owner who resides in a
Dwelling Unit on a regular permanent basis, or who otherwise
occupies a nonresidential portion of the Premises on a regular
permanent basis.
q. PERSON – any person, partnership, firm, association,
corporation, or municipal authority or any other group acting as
a single unit.
r. POLICE DEPARTMENT – the Police Department of the City
of Hazleton or any member thereof sworn to enforce laws and
ordinances in the City, and includes the Chief of Police or his
designee.
s. PREMISES – any parcel of real property in the City, including
the land and all buildings and structures in which one or more
Rental Units are located.
t. RENTAL UNIT – means a Dwelling Unit or Rooming Unit
which is Let for Occupancy and is occupied by one or more
Tenants.
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u. ROOMING UNIT – any room or groups of rooms forming a
single habitable unit occupied or intended to be occupied for
sleeping or living, but not for cooking purposes.
v. TENANT – any Person authorized by the Owner or Agent
who occupies a Rental Unit within a Premises regardless of
whether such Person has executed a lease for said Premises.
SECTION 2. APPOINTMENT OF AN AGENT AND/OR
MANAGER
Each Owner who is not an Owner-occupant, or who does not
reside in the City of Hazleton or within a ten (10) mile air radius
of the City limits, shall appoint an Agent who shall reside in the
City or within a ten (10) mile air radius of the City limits.
SECTION 3. DUTIES OF THE OWNER AND/OR AGENT
a. The Owner has the duty to maintain the Premises in good
repair, clean and sanitary condition, and to maintain the
Premises in compliance with the current Codes, Building Codes
and Zoning Ordinance of the City of Hazleton. The Owner may
delegate implementation of these responsibilities to an Agent.
b. The duties of the Owner and/or Agent shall be to receive
notices and correspondence, including service of process, from
the City of Hazleton; to arrange for the inspection of the Rental
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Units; do or arrange for the performance of maintenance,
cleaning, repair, pest control, snow and ice removal, and ensure
continued compliance of the Premises with the current Codes,
Building Codes and Zoning Ordinance in effect in the City of
Hazleton, as well as arrange for garbage removal.
c. The name, address and telephone number of the Owner and
Agent, if applicable, shall be reported to the Code Enforcement
Office in writing upon registering the Rental Units.
d. No Dwelling Unit shall be occupied, knowingly by the Owner
or Agent, by a number of persons that is in excess of the
requirements outlined in 2003 International Property
Maintenance Code, Chapter 4, Light, Ventilation, and
Occupancy Limits, Section PM-404.5, Overcrowding, or any
update thereof, a copy of which is appended hereto and made a
part hereof.
SECTION 4. NOTICES
a. Whenever an Inspector or Code Enforcement Officer
determines that any Rental Unit or Premises fails to meet the
requirements set forth in the applicable Codes, the Inspector or
Code Enforcement Officer shall issue a correction notice setting
forth the violations and ordering the Occupant, Owner or Agent,
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as appropriate, to correct such violations.
The notice shall:
1) Be in writing;
2) Describe the location and nature of the violation;
3) Establish a reasonable time for the correction of the violation.
b. All notices shall be served upon the Occupant, Owner or
Agent, as applicable, personally or by certified mail, return
receipt requested. A copy of any notices served solely on an
Occupant shall also be provided to the Owner or Agent. In the
event service is first attempted by mail and the notice is returned
by the postal authorities marked “unclaimed” or “refused”, then
the Code Enforcement Office or Police Department shall
attempt delivery by personal service on the Occupant, Owner or
Agent, as applicable. The Code Enforcement Office shall also
post the notice at a conspicuous place on the Premises. If
personal service directed to the Owner or Agent cannot be
accomplished after a reasonable attempt to do so, then the notice
may be sent to the Owner or Agent, as applicable, at the address
stated on the most current registration application for the
Premises in question, by regular first class mail, postage prepaid.
If such notice is not returned by the postal authorities within five
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(5) days of its deposit in the U.S. Mail, then it shall be deemed
to have been delivered to and received by the addressee on the
fifth day following its deposit in the United States Mail.
c. For purposes of this Ordinance, any notice hereunder that is
given to the Agent shall be deemed as notice given to the
Owner.
d. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that any notice that is
given to the Occupant, Owner or Agent under this ordinance
shall have been received by such Occupant, Owner or Agent if
the notice was served in the manner provided by this ordinance.
e. Subject to paragraph 4.d above, a claimed lack of knowledge
by the Owner or Agent, if applicable, of any violation hereunder
cited shall be no defense to closure of rental units pursuant to
Section 9, as long as all notices prerequisite to such proceedings
have been given and deemed received in accordance with the
provisions of this ordinance.
f. All notices shall contain a reasonable time to correct, or take
steps to correct, violations of the above. The Occupant, Owner
or Agent to whom the notice was addressed may request
additional time to correct violations. Requests for additional
time must be in writing and either deposited in the U.S. Mail
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(post-marked) or handdelivered to the Code Enforcement Office
within five (5) days of receipt of the notice by the Occupant,
Owner or Agent. The City retains the right to deny or modify
time extension requests. If the Occupant, Owner or Agent is
attempting in good faith to correct violations but is unable to do
so within the time specified in the notice, the Occupant, Owner
or Agent shall have the right to request such additional time as
may be needed to complete the correction work, which request
shall not be unreasonably withheld.
g. Failure to correct violations within the time period stated in
the notice of violation shall result in such actions or penalties as
are set forth in Section 10 of this ordinance. If the notice of
violation relates to actions or omissions of the Occupant, and the
Occupant fails to make the necessary correction, the Owner or
Agent may be required to remedy the condition. No adverse
action shall be taken against an Owner or Agent for failure to
remedy a condition so long as the Owner or Agent is acting with
due diligence and taking bona fide steps to correct the violation,
including but not limited to pursuing remedies under a lease
agreement with an Occupant or Tenant. The City shall not be
precluded from pursuing an enforcement action against any
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Occupant or Tenant who is deemed to be in violation.
SECTION 5. INSURANCE
In order to protect the health, safety and welfare of the residents
of the City, it is hereby declared that the city shall require hazard
and general liability insurance for all property owners letting
property for occupancy in the City.
a. Minimum coverage; use of insurance proceeds. All Owners
shall be required to obtain a minimum of fifty thousand
($50,000.00) dollars in general liability insurance, and hazard
and casualty insurance in an amount sufficient to either restore
or remove the building in the event of a fire or other casualty.
Further, in the event of any fire or loss covered by such
insurance, it shall be the obligation of the Owner to use such
insurance proceeds to cause the restoration or demolition or
other repair of the property in adherence to the City Code and all
applicable ordinances.
b. Property owners to provide City with insurance information.
Owners shall be required to place their insurance company
name, policy number and policy expiration date on their Rental
Property Registration form, or in the alternative, to provide the
Code Enforcement Office with a copy of a certificate of
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insurance. A registration Certificate (see Section 6 below) shall
not be issued to any Owner or Agent unless the aforementioned
information has been provided to the Code Enforcement Office.
The Code Enforcement Office shall be informed of any change
in policies for a particular rental property or cancellation of a
policy for said property within thirty (30) days of said change or
cancellation.
SECTION 6. RENTAL REGISTRATION AND LICENSE
REQUIREMENTS
a. No Person shall hereafter occupy, allow to be occupied,
advertise for occupancy, solicit occupants for, or let to another
person for occupancy any Rental Unit within the City for which
an application for license has not been made and filed with the
Code Enforcement Office and for which there is not an effective
license. Initial application and renewal shall be made upon
forms furnished by the Code Enforcement Office for such
purpose and shall specifically require the following minimum
information:
1) Name, mailing address, street address and phone number of
the Owner, and if the Owner is not a natural person, the name,
address and phone number of a designated representative of the
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Owner.
2) Name, mailing address, street address and phone number of
the Agent of the Owner, if applicable.
3) The street address of the Premises being registered.
4) The number and types of units within the Premises (Dwelling
Units or Rooming Units) The Owner or Agent shall notify the
Code Enforcement Office of any changes of the above
information within thirty (30) days of such change.
b. The initial application for registration and licensing shall be
made by personally filing an application with the Code
Enforcement Office by November 1, 2006. Thereafter, any new
applicant shall file an application before the Premises is let for
occupancy, or within thirty (30) days of becoming an Owner of
a currently registered Premises. One application per property is
required, as each property will receive its own license.
c. Upon receipt of the initial application or any renewal thereof
and the payment of applicable fees as set forth in Section 7
below, the Code Enforcement Office shall issue a Rental
Registration License to the Owner within thirty (30) days of
receipt of payment.
d. Each new license issued hereunder, and each renewal license,
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shall expire on October 31 of each year. The Code Enforcement
Office shall mail license renewal applications to the Owner or
designated Agent on or before September 1 of each year.
Renewal applications and fees may be returned by mail or in
person to the Code Enforcement Office. A renewal license will
not be issued unless the application and appropriate fee has been
remitted.
SECTION 7. FEES.
a. Annual License Fee. There shall be a license fee for the initial
license and an annual renewal fee thereafter. Fees shall be
assessed against and payable by the Owner in the amount of
$5.00 per Rental Unit, payable at the time of initial registration
and annual renewal, as more specifically set forth in Section 6
above.
b. Occupancy Permit Fee. There shall be a one-time occupancy
permit fee of $10.00 for every new Occupant, which is payable
by the Occupant. For purposes of initial registration under this
ordinance, this fee shall be paid for all current Occupants by
November 1, 2006. Thereafter, prior to occupying any Rental
Unit, all Occupants shall obtain an occupancy permit. It shall be
the Occupant’s responsibility to submit an occupancy permit
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application to the Code Enforcement Office, pay the fee and
obtain the occupancy permit. If there are multiple Occupants in
a single Rental Unit, each Occupant shall obtain his or her own
permit. Owner or Agent shall notify all prospective Occupants
of this requirement and shall not permit occupancy of a Rental
Unit unless the Occupant first obtains an occupancy permit.
Each occupancy permit issued is valid only for the Occupant for
as long as the Occupant continues to occupy the Rental Unit for
which such permit was applied. Any relocation to a different
Rental Unit requires a new occupancy permit. All Occupants age
65 and older, with adequate proof of age, shall be exempt from
paying the permit fee, but shall be otherwise required to comply
with this section and the rest of the Ordinance.
1. Application for occupancy permits shall be made upon forms
furnished by the Code Enforcement Office for such purpose and
shall specifically require the following minimum information:
a) Name of Occupant
b) Mailing address of Occupant
c) Street address of Rental Unit for which Occupant is
applying, if different from mailing address
d) Name of Landlord
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e) Date of lease commencement
f) Proof of age if claiming exemption from the permit fee
g) Proper identification showing proof of legal citizenship
and/or residency
2. Upon receipt of the application and the payment of applicable
fees as set forth above, the Code Enforcement Office shall issue
an Occupancy Permit to the Occupant immediately.
SECTION 8. ENFORCEMENT
a. The following persons are hereby authorized to enforce this
Ordinance:
1. The Chief of Police
2. Any Police Officer
3. Code Enforcement Officer
4. The Fire Chief
5. Deputy Fire Chief of the City of Hazleton.
6. Health Officer
7. Director of Public Works
b. The designation of any person to enforce this Ordinance or
authorization of an Inspector, when in writing, and signed by a
person authorized by Section 8.a to designate or authorize an
Inspector to enforce this Ordinance, shall be prima facie
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evidence of such authority before the Magisterial District Judge,
Court of Common Pleas, or any other Court, administrative body
of the City, or of this commonwealth, and the designating
Director or Supervisor need not be called as a witness thereto.
SECTION 9. FAILURE TO CORRECT VIOLATIONS.
If any Person shall fail, refuse or neglect to comply with a notice
of violation as set forth in Section 4 above, the City shall have
the right to file an enforcement action with the Magisterial
District Judge against any Person the City deems to be in
violation. If, after hearing, the Magisterial District Judge
determines that such Person or Persons are in violation, the
Magisterial District Judge may, at the City’s request, order the
closure of the Rental Unit(s), or assess fines in accordance with
Section 10 below, until such violations are corrected. Such order
shall be stayed pending any appeal to the Court of Common
Pleas of Luzerne County.
SECTION 10. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THIS
ORDINANCE; PENALTIES
a. Except as provided in subsections 10.b and 10.c below, any
Person who shall violate any provision of the Ordinance shall,
upon conviction thereof after notice and a hearing before the
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Magisterial District Judge, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less
than $100.00 and not more than $300.00 plus costs, or
imprisonment for a term not to exceed ninety (90) days in
default of payment. Every day that a violation of this Ordinance
continues shall constitute a separate offense, provided, however,
that failure to register or renew or pay appropriate fees in a
timely manner shall not constitute a continuing offense but shall
be a single offense not subject to daily fines.
b. Any Owner or Agent who shall allow any Occupant to occupy
a Rental Unit without first obtaining an occupancy permit is in
violation of Section 7.b and shall, upon conviction thereof after
notice and a hearing before the Magisterial District Judge, be
sentenced to pay a fine of $1,000 for each Occupant that does
not have an occupancy permit and $100 per Occupant per day
for each day that Owner or Agent continues to allow each such
Occupant to occupy the Rental Unit without an occupancy
permit after Owner or Agent is given notice of such violation
pursuant to Section 4 above. Owner or Agent shall not be held
liable for the actions of Occupants who allow additional
occupancy in any Rental Unit without the Owner or Agent’s
written permission, provided that Owner or Agent takes
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reasonable steps to remove or register such unauthorized
Occupant(s) within ten (10) days of learning of their
unauthorized occupancy in the Rental Unit.
c. Any Occupant having an occupancy permit but who allows
additional occupancy in a Rental Unit without first obtaining the
written permission of the Owner or Agent and without requiring
each such additional Occupant to obtain his or her own
occupancy permit is in violation of Section 7.b of this ordinance
and shall, upon conviction thereof after notice and a hearing
before the Magisterial District Judge, be sentenced to pay a fine
of $1,000 for each additional Occupant permitted by Occupant
that does not have an occupancy permit and $100 per additional
Occupant per day for each day that Occupant continues to allow
each such additional Occupant to occupy the Rental Unit
without an occupancy permit after Occupant is given
written notice of such violation by Owner or Agent or pursuant
to Section 4 above.
SECTION 11. APPLICABILITY AND EXEMPTIONS TO
THE ORDINANCE
The provisions of the ordinance shall not apply to the following
properties, which are exempt from registration and license
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requirements:
a. Hotels, Motels and Dormitories.
b. Rental Units owned by Public Authorities as defined under
the Pennsylvania Municipal Authorities Act, and Dwelling Units
that are part of an elderly housing multi-unit building which is
75% occupied by individuals over the age of sixty-five.
c. Multi-dwelling units that operate under Internal Revenue
Service Code Section 42 concerning entities that operate with an
elderly component.
d. Properties which consist of a double home, half of which is
let for occupancy and half of which is Owner-occupied as the
Owner’s residence.
SECTION 12. CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION
All registration information collected by the City under this
Ordinance shall be maintained as confidential and shall not be
disseminated or released to any individual, group or
organization for any purpose except as provided herein or
required by law. Information may be released only to authorized
individuals when required during the course of an official City,
state or federal investigation or inquiry.
SECTION 13. SAVINGS CLAUSE
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This ordinance shall not affect violations of any other ordinance,
code or regulation existing prior to the effective date thereof and
any such violations shall be governed and shall continue to be
punishable to the full extent of the law under the provisions of
those ordinances, codes or regulations in effect at the time the
violation was committed.
SECTION 14. SEVERABILITY
If any section, clause, provision or portion of this Ordinance
shall be held invalid or unconstitutional by any Court of
competent jurisdiction, such decision shall not affect any other
section, clause, provision or portion of this Ordinance so long as
it remains legally enforceable without the invalid portion. The
City reserves the right to amend this Ordinance or any portion
thereof from time to time as it shall deem advisable in the best
interest of the promotion of the purposes and intent of this
Ordinance, and the effective administration thereof.
SECTION 15. EFFECTIVE DATE
This Ordinance shall become effective immediately upon
approval. This Ordinance repeals Ordinance number 2004-11
and replaces same in its entirety.
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SECTION 16.
This Ordinance is enacted by the Council of the City of
Hazleton under the authority of the Act of Legislature, April 13,
1972, Act No. 62, known as the “Home Rule Charter and
Optional Plans Law”, and all other laws enforceable the
State of Pennsylvania.
